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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about aspects of how the Supreme Court performs its work,
more specifically about practicality in the face of increased requests that it hears
cases. In particular, it explores how the Supreme Court chooses to deal with
multiple cases on the same issues. Scholars have paid insufficient attention to the
Court’s exercise of its choices to grant several related petitions and then to
consolidate them or instead to proceed on a single case-by-single case basis. The
Court might hear more than one case on the same issue or subject over the course
of a term and issue opinions in each as the opinion is ready for filing. Or the Court
might release the opinions in those cases at the same time, whether or not their
authors refer to the other case(s). Or the Justices might group cases on a legal issue
for immediately sequential oral argument, with the Court releasing opinions
simultaneously but each with its own caption. Or they may find that separately
argued cases raise a common issue so that the Court should handle the cases in one
opinion. Related is the question of how the Court handles multiple certiorari

* B.A., Antioch College; M.A., Ph.D. (political science), University of Oregon. Professor Emeritus of
Political Science, University at Albany-SUNY. Residing at Eastham, Mass. I wish to thank Scott Hendrickson,
who suggested that an “innocent” (if somewhat misguided) post to “lawcourt” (the listserve of the Law & Courts
Section of the American Political Science Association) contained an RQ (research question), thus moving the
matter from under-informed speculation to empirical study; Richard Irving, Dewey Graduate Library, University
at Albany, for Westlaw searches;, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, for his close reading and most helpful suggestions on
earlier versions; and Aaron Lorenz and fellow panelists at the meeting of the New England Political Science
Association, Portland ME, April 26, 2019. The data presented herein was collected by the author.
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petitions raising the same issue. The Court might grant review to several such
cases, have them argued at the same time, and decide them together. Or it might
select one case—as a “stand-in” for all the others, without saying so—and then
deny review to the others or grant cert, vacate, and remand (“GVR”) in light of the
lead case.
The foci in this article are, first, on consolidation and grouping in the Supreme
Court and second, on the Court’s GVR practice. Consolidation and GVRs are
examined in the same article because of an inverse relationship that can be posited
between the two; the decrease in the use of consolidation has been accompanied
by an increase in the use of GVRs. This article was undertaken because
accountings of both consolidation and GVRs have been needed for some time,
despite the importance of both practices, and—especially in recent times—the
frequent use of the latter. The phenomena of consolidation, grouping, and linkage
will be discussed further, followed by an examination of the actual practice by the
Court for them and for its use of GVRs in periods of varying length: the late 1950s;
the late 1960s and early 1970s during the Warren Court-to-Burger Court transition;
and a more extended period from the mid-1980s to the present. Changes in
practices—as well as Court’s “shrunken docket” of published opinions—could
well have resulted from shifts in Court personnel, but—with some exceptions—
particular Justices are not the focus of this examination.
I.

CONSOLIDATION, GROUPING, AND LINKAGE

A. Overview of Consolidating or Grouping Cases
It is sometimes said that the Supreme Court “consolidates” cases. And the
presence of several case names in the caption at the “top” of a case might suggest
as much.1 Yet not all “consolidation” is identical. The clearest instance occurs
when the Supreme Court, to obtain great perspective on a legal issue, takes cases
from different circuits, or different state high courts, and decides them as one case.
The term also applies when, at times, the Court takes more than one case on the
same issue from a single court below.2
However, there is a considerable difference between the Court’s taking cases
from several different courts for consideration and decision in one opinion and the

1. The practice in West’s Supreme Court Reporter is to list the cases, one below the previous one. In the
United States Reports, there are instances in which one case is listed, followed by an asterisk footnote showing
“along with” the name(s) of the other cases(s).
2. The Court’s treatment of its denials of certiorari is not treated in this article, but it should be noted that
when more than one cert petition is filed from a single case, perhaps because there were multiple parties on the
side that lost below, the Court does not necessarily list them together in the orders. See, e.g., Rachel v. United
States, Cutulle v. United States, and Brewer v. United States, below all at 692 F. App’x. 334 (9th Cir. 2017). The
cert denial in Rachel appears at 138 S. Ct. 685 (2017), but the Cutulle and Brewer cert denials are at 138 S. Ct.
688 (2017).
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not-uncommon event of having two case captions deriving from a single U.S. court
of appeals ruling because of cross-petitions for certiorari.
Perhaps the best-known instance of consolidation happened with the 1954 and
1955 school desegregation cases brought together for argument, with four decided
as Brown v. Board of Education (1954)3 and the fifth case, Bolling v. Sharpe,
receiving a separate opinion because it was based on the Fifth—rather than the
Fourteenth—Amendment.4 After Brown, one of the most notable instances in
which multiple cases were consolidated for decision was Miranda v. Arizona,5 one
of four cases each from a different state; if the cases had been listed in a different
order, we might have had the “Westover rights” or the “Vignera card” instead of
the “Miranda rules.”
In what might be called grouping, there are instances in which more than one
case is argued sequentially over a one- or two-day period and the Court, while not
consolidating them into a single ruling, issues the decisions in those cases at the
same time, so that they are adjacent to each other in the case reports. A significant
instance of grouping cases occurred in the “one person-one vote” state legislative
redistricting cases. The lead case was Reynolds v. Sims,6 from Alabama, which
dealt with three rulings from the Middle District of Alabama and thus a modest
consolidation. What was important, however, was that Reynolds v. Sims was
immediately followed by—that is, grouped with—five other cases, from New
York, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, and Colorado.7 These cases were not only
grouped but linked (see discussion below) because of separate opinions applying
to more than one case, with Justice Clark cross-referencing his Reynolds
concurrence; Justice Harlan’s notation of dissent referring to his Reynolds dissent;
and Justice Stewart, writing a separate opinion in the Delaware case, referring to
his dissent in the ruling on Colorado reapportionment.8
Grouping may also take place when cases are argued separately but then
grouped for filing on the same day, or when the Court has agreed to review more
than one case on a subject or closely-related subjects and the cases are argued at
different times but they are handed down simultaneously, perhaps because the
Justices in conference saw the close relationship and discussed them together, with
the opinions in each relating to the others in this informal “set” of cases. Such cases
would appear to be “consolidated” in the sense that they appear together in the case
reports, but it is better to say they were “grouped,” not consolidated. Nonetheless,
when this happens, there may be no real difference between grouping and

3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
7. WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377
U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. FortyFourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
8. See Md. Comm., 377 U.S. at 676; Lucas, 377 U.S. at 744; and Roman, 377 U.S. at 712.
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consolidation. Conversely, cases on a related subject may be set for argument one
after the other but receive separate opinions handed down at the same time.
In fact, there will be greater “consolidation”—for purposes of obtaining
broader perspectives on an issue—when several cases on the same subject have
been argued at the same time and handed down on the same day in separate
opinions than when a case has several case captions but all stem from a single case
below. On the other hand, the Court may decide several cases that appear to the
reader to be related but which the Court hands down at different times during the
Term in the “normal order,” as in one Term when it had many cases related to the
underdeveloped law of double jeopardy.
At times, grouped cases are also linked. This occurs when one or more justices
write concurring or dissenting opinions applying across grouped cases. The
abortion cases provide an example, as Roe v. Wade9 and Doe v. Bolton10 were
handed down at the same time, and the three separate opinions—Chief Justice
Burger, concurring; Justice Douglas, concurring; and Justice White (joined by
Justice Rehnquist), dissenting—covering both cases.11 Later, when the Court
grouped the Akron and Kansas City abortion cases,12 Justice O’ Connor’s dissent
in the latter case provided a link between the two when she wrote, in part, “For
reasons stated in my dissent in Akron . . .”13 In another instance, in the 1976 capital
punishment cases, Justices Brennan and Marshall filed a dissent, applying to the
Gregg, Profitt, and Jurek cases.14 Then in two additional cases decided at the same
time, they filed brief opinions referencing that dissent.15 Linkage is perhaps
clearest when a Justice writes a separate opinion that covers more than one case.
Thus, in two cases on the party plaintiff in securities suits, Smith v. Sperling and
Swanson v. Traer,16 Justice Frankfurter’s dissent for four Justices (Justices Burton,
Harlan, and Whittaker joined him) covered both cases.17 And Frankfurter wrote a
very long (nearly forty-page) dissent—far longer than the majority opinions—
covering three cases on courts’ jurisdiction under the Taft-Hartley Act, including
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills.18 Somewhat the same thing occurred in the

9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
11. Respectively, 410 U.S. at 207 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 410 U.S. at 209 (Douglas, J., concurring), 410
U.S. at 221 (White, J. dissenting).
12. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas
City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
13. Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, 462 U.S. at 504 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
14. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting) (applying Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)))).
15. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring, & Marshall, J.,
concurring); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 326 (1976) (Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., concurring).
16. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957); Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
17. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. at 98.
18. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Goodall-Sanford v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957); Gen. Electric Co. v. Local 205,
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 353 U.S. 547(1957).
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Garmon labor relations preemption.19 In Guss, there was a note, “For dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Clark, see . . ,” with a similar note
in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, and the dissent by Justice Burton (joined by Justice
Clark) ran under the captions for all three cases.20 (One wonders why the three
cases were not consolidated).
One would expect linkage to take place within a simultaneously decided pair
or set of cases, as on June 4, 1956, when the Court issued a decision in Autoworkers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board21 and a per curiam summarily affirming
in Autoworkers v. Anderson,22 with three Justices noting that their dissent applied
to both.23 And linkage might also occur in connection with cases in which the Court
granted cert and reversed and remanded (see Sec. II). Thus, when cert was granted
in Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.24 with the case remanded for trial, Justice
Frankfurter—who would not have granted the writ—referred to his dissent in
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.25 decided a month earlier, and Justices
Harlan and Whittaker dissented on the basis of Harlan’s Rogers opinion.26
The linkages among cases could be complicated, as can be seen in a set of
Federal Employee Labor Act (“FELA”) cases, made more complex by Justice
Frankfurter’s long-standing resistance to the Court’s handling such cases. On
November 7, 1956, the Court heard arguments in several such cases and handed
down decisions on February 25, 1957. The Court noted that the dissents by Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan could be found at a later cite. What made this complex was
that—apart from the separate dissents—the alignments of the Justices were not
identical across the cases. In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,27 Justice
Brennan wrote for the Court, reversing the lower court with Justice Burton
concurring in the result; Justice Reed dissented on the merits, on the basis of the
Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling; Justice Harlan also dissented; and Justice
Frankfurter voted to DIG the case (dismiss as improvidently granted).28 Brennan
also wrote for the Court in the second case, Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,29
with Justice Burton again only concurring in the result, while Justice Reed would
have confirmed the ruling of the court of appeals.30 In Herdman v. Pennsylvania

19. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of N. Am., Local No. 427 v. Fairlaw Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957); and San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
20. Guss, 353 U.S. at 12; Amal. Meat Cutters, 353 U.S. at 1 (Burton, J., & Clark, J., dissenting).
21. 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
22. 352 U.S. 959 (1956).
23. United Autoworkers, 351 U.S. at 275 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. 353 U.S. 920 (1957).
25. 352 U.S. 500, 524 (1957).
26. The Burton dissent from Shaw was without opinion.
27. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
28. Id. at 511 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. 352 U.S. 512 (1957).
30. Id. at 517 (Burton, J., concurring & Reed, J. dissenting).
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Railroad Co.,31 Brennan again wrote, while Harlan concurred, and Frankfurter
again dissented.32
In the last case of the four, Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,33 Justice
Douglas wrote for only a plurality which included Justice Brennan, with Justice
Burton concurring in the result, Justice Reed saying he would affirm the court of
appeals, and Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissenting.34 Harlan’s separate
opinion—addressing all four cases—indicated he concurred in one but dissented
in the others. Frankfurter—in an example of his war with FELA cases—dissented,
venting at great length against the FELA and attaching a five-to-six page list of
FELA cases.35 Over a month after these decisions, the Court issued a per curiam
reversal on the basis of the previous cases, with Frankfurter again voting to DIG,
and Justices Harlan and Whittaker dissenting based on the earlier Harlan dissent,
and Burton also dissenting.36 In a case argued after the above cases, the Court
issued another per curiam decision on April 24–25, 1957 and simply cited the
earlier series of FELA cases.37
B. Consolidation, Grouping, and Linking: More Basics
All these devices—consolidation, grouping, and linking—are ways in which
the justices provide greater focus on particular issues they have agreed to decide.
Even if different Justices could have opinions bearing on these issues “ready to
go” at the same time, giving the appearance of coincidence, consolidation,
grouping, and linking are intention. The Court is explicit about consolidating cases,
stating as much when it grants cert or sets oral argument. Thus, in granting
certiorari to Flexer v. United States from the D.C. Circuit, the cert grant order
added, “and case assigned for argument immediately following No. 787.”38 A short
time before, the Court had done the same with F. Strauss & Son of Arkansas v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stating, “Case transferred to the summary
calendar and assigned for argument immediately follow No. 718,”39 with the two
cases consolidated for decision.40 Likewise in other cases, the Court’s cert-grant
order at times showed the “grouping” of cases as they were placed on the argument
calendar behind certain already-calendared cases, as when the order granting cert

31. 352 U.S. 518 (1958).
32. Id. at 524 (Frankfurter J., dissenting); id. at 559 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. 352 U.S. 521 (1958).
34. Id. at 524 (Burton, J., concurring & Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at
559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 559–560 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
36. Deen v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 925 (1958).
37. Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 360 (1958) (per curiam).
38. Flaxer v. United States, 357 U.S. 904, 904 (1958) (granting cert). The case was argued on November
19, 1958 and decided on December 15, 1958.
39. 356 U.S. 966, 966 (1958) (granting cert); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
40. See Cammarano, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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to Trop v. Dulles stated, “The case is assigned for arguing immediately following
No. 572 and No. 415.”41
Yet there are also many instances when the Court could have consolidated but
did not. There have even been occasional explicit denials of motions to
consolidate, perhaps with cases to which review had already been granted.42 These
motions may accompany petitions for certiorari or may be filed separately. At
times, denial of consolidation is apparently only from examination of the Court’s
docket, with no mention in the order denying review.43 When the Court does not
explicitly state that it has declined to consolidate,44 the consolidation may be
obvious, as when the Court granted cert on the same day to two Second Circuit
immigration cases relating to court jurisdiction over immigrants’ habeas petitions
under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”).45 And three weeks after the Witkovich case46 (April 29 to May 20,
1957), the Court issued a per curiam affirmance in a related case, which seemed
appropriate for Court consolidation.47
At times it may be difficult to determine—at least from the case caption
alone—whether cases have been consolidated. In 2015, the Court decided United
States v. Kwai Fun Wong; United States v. June was listed with it in the case
caption and both cases were from the Ninth Circuit. But the cases were from
different districts and the court of appeals had decided them separately.48 In its
ruling, the Supreme Court dropped a footnote saying “we did not consolidate these
cases, [but] we address them together because everyone agrees that the same
arguments for and against equitable tolling apply equally to both.”49 For analytic
purposes, that is certainly consolidation—whatever the Court may be saying.
This labeling is not merely a theoretical matter. How one counts multicaptioned cases affects how we view the amount of work the Supreme Court
completes in a Term, and thus it has implications for how we view its caseload in
this period of the Court’s “shrunken docket,” its extended recent period of 70 or
41. Trop v. Dulles, 352 U.S. 1023, 1023 (1957). Trop, which had been restored to the calendar for
reargument, 354 U.S. 935 (1957), was decided at 356 U.S. 86 (1958); see also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1968); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
42. Glinsey v. United States, 531 U.S. 919 (2000) (denying consolidation with Bartnicki v. Vopper and
United States v. Vopper, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000) (cert granted). The opinions in those two consolidated cases are
at 532 U.S. 514 (2001); see also Dubin and Young v. Bank of Hawaii, 537 U.S. 943 (2002) (denying consolidation
and denying certiorari).
43. See, e.g., Larbie v. Larbie, 568 U.S. 1192 (2012).
44. It is not likely that it will be known whether they discussed the matter until—and if—the Justices leave
their papers for our perusal.
45. These cases were granted certiorari and decided the same day. INS v. St. Cyr, 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted,
533 U.S. 348 (2001).
46. United States v. Witkoich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
47. Barton v. Sentner, 353 U.S. 963 (1957).
48. Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2014); June v. United States, 560 F. App’x
505 (2014).
49. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408 n.1 (2015).
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fewer decisions per Term. It makes a difference how one counts the Court’s
rulings, regardless of the number of case captions in each case—for example,
whether one counts each ruling as one case or instead counts each caption in a
multi-captioned case separately. If one counts separate case titles in case captions,
the number of cases the Court disposes of would be—perhaps significantly—
higher than if one used the number of opinions (at the rate of one majority or
plurality opinion per case). Given that additional case names in a case caption often
reflect only multiple cert petitions from a single case below when both (or more)
parties seek review, or cross-appeals in legislative redistricting cases (that come to
the court on appeal from three-judge district courts, not on certiorari from the U.S.
courts of appeals or from state high(er) courts), inclusion of those case titles would
make it appear that the Court is doing more work than it in fact is accomplishing.
C. Captions and Consolidation
Not every time one sees more than one case caption at the beginning of a
Supreme Court opinion has consolidation—or at least the same type of
consolidation—occurred. In fact, the Supreme Court’s “consolidation” of cases is
of several types. At the start, there are instances in which two or more case names
appear in the case caption. The most obvious instance of consolidation is when the
Court has granted review to cases from more than one lower court, as when one
case is from one U.S. court of appeals and another is from another circuit—or when
cases are from state courts in different states. In this type of consolidation, the
Court takes more than one case to provide itself with a wider range of factual
situations impinging on the issue(s) for which it granted cert.
Alternatively, at times the two or more cases listed in the caption come from
the same circuit. The Court’s granting of cert to separate rulings below is but a
slightly different instance of consolidation, if the separate rulings below are
different applications of the same doctrinal matter. Yet the Court’s decision to
review more than one ruling from a given circuit court of appeals may not be real
consolidation if the court of appeals cases resulted in closely related—even
intermeshed—rulings and there was a multiplicity of parties, each of which might
be in a position to file certiorari petitions. And what might appear to be the Court’s
consolidating cases when multiple case captions are present may in fact only
reflect consolidation below. In short, a multi-case caption may not be “real”
consolidation if the multiple cases stem from the same single ruling below and
result from cert petitions filed by different parties objecting to the same result or
to different aspects of a multi-part decision—which is not to be confused with the
Court’s joining of cases that were separate below. Thus, the granting multiple
petitions from a single U.S. court of appeals ruling is not always “consolidation”
in the sense used here, even though the Court might be said to be engaged in
“house-cleaning consolidation” to account for all loose ends. When a court of
appeals has consolidated several cases from different districts and issued a single
opinion covering all of them, certainly consolidation has occurred. But it has not
90
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necessarily occurred in the Supreme Court, even if there were several cert petitions
from that court of appeals ruling. Thus, what might appear to be consolidation (the
presence of multiple case captions) may in fact only reflect consolidation below.
D. Trends.50
In the first years of the Warren Court, O.T. 1955–1960, the Court was deciding
100 or more signed opinions each Term, along with, on average, 17 per curiam
rulings. Per Term, there was an average of a half-dozen instances in which the
Court consolidated cases from the lower courts and seven instances in which the
Court grouped an average of 2.4 cases for filing; all the grouped cases constituted
slightly under one-sixth of all plenary decisions (15.5%). Some of the grouped
cases were linked through Justices’ separate opinions, but with an opinion in each
case, the cases were not consolidated.
Grouping is not hard to find in these earlier years, in part because the Court
decided more cases than it has in recent decades. For example, in O.T. 1956, three
of the “Communist cases”—Service v. Dulles, Watkins v. United States, and
Sweezey v. New Hampshire,51 in which the Court backed off from its earlier,
severely criticized opinions—were handed down sequentially on the same day
(June 17, 1957), although they had not been argued back-to-back (Sweezey on
March 5 and Watkins on March 7, but Service not until a month later, on April 2–
3). There could even be an explicit reference to the grouping, as when Justice
Whittaker, writing in both of two cases argued sequentially and handed down on
the same day, said, “This is a companion case to . . .”52
In O.T. 1969–1972, the beginning of the Burger Court and the transition to its
full membership, was one in which the number of signed opinions per Term was
over 120, with over 150 in O.T. 1972. The number of per curiam dispositions was
much higher than in the earlier period: the average number was over 90, with a
particularly large number (130) in O.T. 1972, perhaps in part be a result of Burger
Court practice in designating certain dispositions as per curiams. Despite the larger
number of cases, there were fewer consolidations—only nine in the entire four
Terms, with five of those, including two per curiams, coming in O.T. 1969 and
with none in O.T. 1972. The Court engaged in the same amount of grouping of
cases per term (seven) as the Warren Court terms examined, with grouped cases
constituting roughly one-eighth of the Court’s plenary ruling, a slight decrease
from the earlier period.

50. As noted earlier, the data presented here were collected by the author. Especially as to per curiam
rulings, there are different modes of counting them, and the Court has used the “per curiam” label in different
ways at different times.
51. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); and Sweezey
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
52. Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 686 (1957); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692
(1957). Lehmann had been argued March 26–27, Mulcahey on March 27. Opinions in both were issued June 3.
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In the 1970s criminal procedure decisions, the capital punishment rulings
provide a further instance of consolidation and grouping in lieu of consolidation,
and the Court’s many decisions on the Double Jeopardy Clause also show grouping
but not in all instances. As to capital punishment, Furman v. Georgia,53 in which
the justices invalidated the death penalty as then practiced, was a consolidation of
two cases from Georgia and one from Texas.54 However, after the states had
developed new death penalty procedures and challenges to those procedures
returned to the Court in 1976, instead of consolidation, the Court grouped the
almost half-dozen cases it decided, hearing argument in them over two days
(March 30–31, 1976) and issuing the decisions in all of them, serially, on the last
day of the Term, July 2, 1976, with Gregg v. Georgia being the lead case.55 Perhaps
the Court only grouped rather than consolidated because there were enough
differences in individual states’ new procedures that a broad statement—similar to
Furman—was thought inappropriate, but whatever the reason, the way the Court
handled the cases did differ from strict consolidation.
As to double jeopardy, when in the 1974–1977 Terms the Court decided more
cases than in the preceding fifteen Terms,56 one finds some of the Court’s nearly
one dozen rulings decided separately from other rulings on the same topic,57 even
when they are handed within close proximity to each other,58 and there are two
instances of grouping—one of two cases59 and one of four cases60—but there are
no consolidations. The reason for the latter may well be that the alignments of the
Justices in these cases are by no means identical, which seems a prerequisite for
full consolidation—and for linking as well.
The numbers and proportions of consolidated and grouped cases described
above may not seem exceptionally large, but the Court would not again come close
to those numbers, as the next Terms examined exhibited a very real change in the
Court’s practice. Where there had been modest differences between the Warren
Court years examined and those from the early Burger Court, there was little
consolidation and almost no grouping during the Rehnquist and early Roberts

53. Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
54. See also Jenkins v. Georgia 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. 1969).
55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 292 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976).
56. STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 195 (4th ed. 1995).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (April 4, 1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977) (June 16, 1977); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (February 21, 1978); see also
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (March 8, 1976); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1986)
(June 30, 1976).
58. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977), decided June 13, 1977, and Jeffers v. United States, 432
U.S. 137 (1977), decided June 16, 1977.
59. Wilson v. United States, 420 U.S. 332 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). Both
cases decided February 20, 1975.
60. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978); Sanabria v. United States,
437 U.S. 54 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). All cases filed on June 14, 1978.
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Courts. In the 1986–1999 Terms, the number of cases with signed opinions after
the first few years began a steep decline, from almost 150 per Term at the
beginning to 100 in O.T. 1992, after which it remained in the 80s until a great
further drop to 72 in O.T. 1999. Thereafter, from O.T. 2000 through O.T. 2016,
the number of signed opinions remained basically in the 70s before falling to the
low 60s at the end of the period. The number of per curiam dispositions showed
some decrease but not of the same magnitude. The number of per curiams in the
early period of this period is not unlike that for the Warren Court period; it then
fell slightly starting with O.T. 1992 but exceeded ten per Term for O.T. 1995–1997
before remaining lower thereafter except for thirteen in O.T. 2009.
The decrease in signed opinions, whatever the reasons—a more stable Court
(that is, one with fewer personnel changes) and a more conservative Court one
(willing to allow, say, pro-prosecution decisions to stand), or a result of the
elimination of all but a small number of cases in the appeal (as distinguished from
certiorari) category in which a decision by the Court was mandated, or something
else61—meant there was less output. With this substantial decrease in the number
of signed opinion cases, it is obvious there were fewer opportunities for
consolidation or grouping. Yet, one sees not only a decrease in the number of
consolidations but also a reduction in the proportion of cases consolidated:
consolidation and grouping decreased far more than the drop in the overall number
of cases could explain. In the fourteen Terms O.T. 1986–1999, there were only
twenty-seven consolidations, a hair under two per Term, with six in one Term
(O.T. 1993), while in four Terms there were none. At the same time, there were
only fourteen instances, accounting for twenty-nine cases, in which the Court
grouped cases, but five Terms saw no groupings. (In one Term, there was a
combination of consolidation and grouping). Overall, for this period, grouped
cases were only 2.0% of the signed opinions, a proportion insignificant compared
to earlier groupings.
The next 17 Terms (O.T. 2000–2016) saw basically the same amount of
consolidation, with thirty-seven cases total or slightly more than two per Term,
while two terms saw no consolidation, but there were seven in one Term (O.T.
2004) and five in two others. Grouping, however, decreased sharply, with only ten
instances (twenty-seven cases), almost all in the first five of these Terms; there
was a stretch of five consecutive Terms without any grouping of cases.62 Grouped
cases constituted even less than in the previous period, being only 0.8% of signed
opinions.
61. See Arthur D. Hellman, “The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court,” 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403
(1997); Ryan Owens & David A. Simon, “Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket,” 53 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1219 (2012) (discussing ideological and contextual factors).
62. The two cases related to same sex marriage, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2651 (2013), on whether
proponents of a Proposition had standing to defend it in Court, and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), invalidating DOMA, were handed down on the same day, so one can say that they were grouped because
of their underlying subject-matter although they were decided on different issues, but they had not been grouped
for argument.
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The death of Justice Scalia left the Court with only eight justices for the key
part of the October 2015 Term, likely affecting its treatment of cases. There were
sixty-two cases decided with signed opinions, plus eighteen per curiams, triple the
previous five Terms’ average number. (All but eleven of the signed opinion cases
and five of the per curiams came after Justice Scalia’s death). Continuing the
pattern of the previous ten Terms, the Court did not group any cases for disposition.
The Court also consolidated cases in three instances: one of which involved two
North Dakota Supreme Court rulings and one Minnesota Supreme Court ruling on
testing for blood-alcohol levels, but the more important of which involved
consolidation of cases from four circuits (Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C.) in the cases
challenging the application of the requirement of insurance coverage of
contraceptives as it applied to religious non-profit organizations.63
In O.T. 2016, in which the Court was also short-handed because Justice
Gorsuch was not seated until near its end, among the sixty signed opinions (and
ten per curiams), there were only three instances of consolidation, accounting for
seven cases. The October 2017 Term saw one obvious consolidation of cases from
the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in a case in which the Court resolved a circuit
split,64 and three groupings. There was also another consolidation that did not pan
out. It concerned challenges to the validity of appointments of an officer to two
military appellate courts. The result was the single case of Ortiz v. United States,65
rejecting defendants’ claim. Initially, the Court granted certiorari to three cases and
consolidated them for argument.66
Indeed, in its decision in Ortiz, the only one decided, the Court noted that it
had “granted and consolidated petitions in two related cases.” However, as the
Court then explained, those cases “raise[d] issues of statutory jurisdiction that our
decision today [in Ortiz] makes it unnecessary to resolve,”67 and the Court thus
DIG’d them when the Ortiz decision was filed—that is, dismissed the cert petitions
in them as improvidently granted.68 The DIG’d Cox case was itself a consolidation
of six cases.69
One of the Term’s groupings was of two cases involving aspects of inter partes
review in patent cases, with both cases coming from the Federal Circuit, argued on
November 27, 2017, and decided on April 24, 2018.70 The other grouping was of

63. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1567 (2016).
64. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Ernst & Young v. Morris, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017);
NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, 138 S. Ct. 51 (2017).
65. 138 S. Ct. 2165–2166 n.2 (2018).
66. Dalmazzi v. United States, and Cox v. United States, both at 138 S. Ct. 53 (2017); Ortiz v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 54 (granting cert).
67. Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2172 n.2.
68. Dalmazzi v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2273 (2018); Cox v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2273 (2018).
69. In addition to Cox: Craig v. United States; Lewis v. United States; Miller v. United States; Morchinek
v. United States, and O’Shaugnessy v. United States, consolidated at 138 S. Ct. 2273 (2018).
70. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2019); Oil States Energy Services g. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138
S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
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two cases from two different three-judge courts (Western Wisconsin and
Maryland) on gerrymandering in which the Court yet again failed to reach the core
question.71 The third, on the effect of change in the Sentencing Guidelines, was a
grouping of two cases from different circuits (the Eighth and Eleventh), both
argued on March 27, 2018, and decided on June 4, 2018.72 What is perhaps most
notable is the Court’s not consolidating two cases which, it is fair to say, it would
have done under earlier practices—the cases on the travel ban Executive Order.
Cases came from two different circuits—the Ninth and the Fourth—with each
having emphasized different aspects of the challenge to the ban (presidential
authority, religious discrimination). Had the Court wanted to deal with only one of
those concerns, taking one case and then denying the other would have made sense.
Yet, having granted review in the Ninth Circuit case—rather than also granting
review to the Fourth Circuit’s en banc ruling—the Court sought supplemental
briefing in the Ninth Circuit case as to the religious discrimination question, and
then deciding the Ninth Circuit case—Trump v. Hawaii73—the Fourth Circuit case
was sent back with a GVR order “in light of Trump v. Hawaii.”74 This substitution
of GVR for consolidation receives attention in the next section.
What about the Supreme Court’s two most recent Terms, O.T. 2018 and O.T.
2019? A quick look at them is in order to see if previously described patterns
continued. There was virtually no case-consolidation in the October 2018 Term,
except on June 27, 2019, two days from Term’s end, when the Court handed down
a decision on the partisan gerrymandering cases, Rucho v. Common Cause and
Lamone v. Benisek,75 which had come to the Court on appeal from, respectively,
the Middle District of North Carolina and the District of Maryland, and in which
the Court had postponed jurisdiction until consideration on the merits. There was
only one other case—the “Bladensburg Cross” case,76 only a week prior to the
gerrymandering cases—that might be considered consolidation, but its double
caption was a result of two cert petitions from a single Fourth Circuit decision.
Beyond those cases, there was only one grouping of cases when, on March 4, 2019,
the Justices handed down two cases on copyright law, Rimini Street, Inc, v. Oracle
USA, Inc.77 on costs in copyright suits, and Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v.
Wall Street. Com. on copyright registration.78 While the two cases had copyright
in common, that was about it: their oral arguments were a week apart (Fourth

71. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (per curiam).
72. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018); Koons v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1783 (2018).
73. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
74. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, and Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, both at 138
S. Ct. 2710 (2018).
75. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Lamone v. Benisek, 139 S. Ct. 783 (2019).
76. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n and Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission v.
American Humanist Association, both at 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
77. 139 S. Ct. 873, 875–76 (2019).
78. 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019).
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Estate on January 8, 2019 and Rimini Street the following week, January 14) and
each case had a different author, respectively, Justices Kavanaugh and Ginsburg.
The picture for October Term 2019 is, however, quite different in having a
number of consolidations—roughly a half-dozen of one type or another, including
some in major decisions— and there was also a de-consolidation. In all, the 2019
Term provides a sharp “bump up” in the Court’s consolidations and grouping of
cases as compared to the previous years, although it is not possible to tell whether
this activity was only a one-Term event or whether it indicates the beginning of a
shift in practice.
The clearest instances of consolidation came at Term’s end, when two of the
Court’s most important decisions—on the employment rights of LBGT persons
and the administration’s rescission of DACA. Before those cases, however, there
had been cases with other types of consolidation. In one of these, GuerreroLasprilla v. Barr,79 the Court, in granting cert, consolidated two “unpublished”
(non-precedential) Fifth Circuit dispositions and decided them in one decision on
whether the U.S. courts of appeals had jurisdiction to review certain questions of
law in immigration cases. In another, the Court handed down Kansas v. Garcia,80
a ruling on three Kansas state court criminal convictions for aliens having used
others’ Social Security numbers to obtain employment; the Kansas Supreme Court
had reversed each conviction in separate opinions but grouped them at decision.
In another case, Maine Community Health Options v. United States,81 on
payment of losses during the phase-in period for the Affordable Care Act, the four
consolidated cases all came from the Federal Circuit, which, in three opinions by
its chief judge (two consolidated in one opinion), had reviewed different decisions
by different trial judges. Yet another consolidation occurred when the Court
granted multiple cert petitions stemming from the First Circuit’s Puerto Rico fiscal
crisis case and consolidated the cases, deciding them as of Financial Oversight
and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment.82
The Puerto Rico cases were handed down on June 1, 2020, but the serious
consolidation took place in the Court’s LGBT and DACA cases. In each, the Court
granted review to cases from several circuits and decided them together.
Announced first, on June 15, was Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia,83 which
decided not only Bostock from the Eleventh Circuit and Altitude Express v. Zarda
from the Second Circuit, both involving gay individuals, but also a Sixth Circuit
case on discrimination against transgender people, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes v. E.E.O.C.
79. 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020); see also Oralles v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020).
80. 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020), with Kansas v. Morales and Kansas v. Ohoa-Lara.
81. 140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020), with Moda Health Plan v. United States Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C. v.
United States; Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Ins. Co. v. United States.
82. 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020), with Aurelius Inv. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Off. Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. Aurelius Inv.; United States v. Aurelius Inv.; Union de Trabajadores De La Industria Electrica Y
Riego v. Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.
83. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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Three days after Bostock came the ruling invalidating the rescission of the
DACA program as arbitrary and capricious. To Department of Homeland Security
v. Regents of the University of California,84 came from the Ninth Circuit, the
Justices joined Trump v. NAACP from the District of Columbia Circuit, and Wolf
v. Batalla Vidal from the Second Circuit, in which the Court had granted certiorari
in the latter two before judgment. In both the gay rights and DACA rulings, the
cases were handed down as a single ruling even though the judgments were not the
same as to each case to which review had been granted: in Bostock, one lower court
ruling was reversed and remanded while those from the other two courts were
affirmed, and in the DACA decision, one lower court ruling was vacated in part
and reversed in part; one was affirmed; and the third was affirmed in part reversed
in part and vacated in part.
During the same week of those decisions, there was also an instance of what
might be called lesser consolidation, in which two cert petitions from the same
Fourth Circuit ruling—on the effect of permits for a pipeline from including
Appalachian Trail land in the National Park System—had been consolidated on
being granted.85 Likewise on June 29, there was also another decision of lesser
consolidation, in which the Court granted two cert petitions from a single Fifth
Circuit case on abortion limits and the matters were argued together in June
Medical Services v. Russo and Russo v. June Medical Services.86
Then finally, as the Term extended beyond the usual final Decision Days well
into July, there was more consolidation and grouping. The Court engaged in both
in the Term’s major religion cases. Handed down on July 8, Little Sisters of the
Poor v. Pennsylvania87 was joined with Trump v. Pennsylvania from the same
Third Circuit ruling on the administration’s broadening of the exception from the
Affordable Care Act’s requirement that employers provide contraceptive coverage
in their employees’ insurance. The Court then ruled on preclusion of Title VII suits
by employees of religious schools and other social services under the Act’s
ministerial exception, with the Court saying so in the consolidated cases of Our
Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and St. James School v. Biel,88 from
separate Ninth Circuit rulings.
Then, on the Term’s last day—July 9—there was more grouping along with
some consolidation—in the cases on efforts to obtain President Trump’s tax
records, in which the president challenged subpoenas from the House of
Representatives and from the District Attorney for Manhattan. Here, in addition to
rejecting the president’s claim of immunity, the Court—by identical 7–2 votes—
upheld the subpoena from the Manhattan DA subject to potential narrowing in the

84. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
85. U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1937 (2020); Atl. Coast Pipeline v.
Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2020).
86. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
87. 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
88. Our Lady Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
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lower court, and essentially rejected the House’s request subject to further
litigation below. There were two rulings, Trump v. Vance89 and Trump v. Mazars
USA,90 but three cases because the latter entailed consolidation of the Mazars case,
which had come from the D.C. Circuit, with Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, from
the Second Circuit, also the origin of Vance.
One can also find instances of linkage in this Term, When the Justices handed
down its 5–4 ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma91 on Indians’ rights to much of
Oklahoma, they issued Sharp v. Murphy,92 in which Justice Gorsuch recused,
deciding it for the reasons given in McGirt. And there was linkage in the Faithless
Electors cases. After ruling unanimously in Chiafalo v. Washington,93 the Court
(minus the recused Justice Sotomayor) issued a per curiam disposition in Colorado
Department of State v. Baca,94 reversing based on Chiafalo. These cases also
illustrate de-consolidation, which is rare but does occur. Earlier, on January 17,
2020, the Court had consolidated these cases, but less than two months later—on
March 10—it terminated the consolidation. Another instance of de-consolidation
had taken place at the end of the 2017 Term when the Court decided Ortiz v. United
States95 on the presence of active-duty military officers serving on both the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces and the Court of Military Commission Review.
In its Ortiz decision, the Court noted in a footnote that at the time it granted cert it
“consolidated petitions in two related cases—Dalmazzi v. United States . . . and
Cox v. United States,” but because “[t]those cases raise issues of statutory
jurisdiction that our disposition today makes it unnecessary to resolve,”96 the Court
separated two cases and dismissed cert as improvidently granted (DIG).97
II. THE COURT’S GRANT, VACATE, AND REMAND (GVR) ORDERS
A. GVR as an Alternative
If the Supreme Court consolidated or grouped cases less frequently, has it also
adopted an alternative consonant with the Court’s smaller output? Indeed, that
appears to have been the case. When faced with an issue, the Justices appeared to
choose to focus on a single case in which it was raised and then to issue GVR
(grant, vacate, and remand) orders, in light of a recent ruling, for the cert petitions
waiting in line. Having seen instances in which, shortly after the Court has decided
a case, it issued a number of GVRs in light of that case as its way of disposing of
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

98

140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020.
140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).
138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018).
Id. at 2172 n.2.
Dalmazzi v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2273 (2018); Cox v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2273 (2018).
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cert petitions from cases that posed the same or a closely related issue, one is
prompted to explore further. Along with the shift in the Court’s practice with
respect to consolidating cases, there is a related shift in the Court’s GVR practice.
Serious attention to that practice has been lacking except for Arthur Hellman’s
now thirty-year-old exploration, in which he examined their implications,98 and
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl’s ten-year-old study, which provided an examination that
was in large part empirical based on the 1996–2006 Terms (and thus ending fifteen
years ago), but which also included some suggestions for reform in the Supreme
Court’s practice.99 Just as there is need for an accounting of changes in practice
with respect to consolidation, the same is true as to GVRs. Despite Bruhl’s study,
which provided some data explored below, more research is necessary. He had
noted “serious gaps in our knowledge” and had said, “Even basic descriptive data
are scarce; we do not know how many GVRs, and of what categories, the Court
has been issuing.”100 Despite alternative uses of GVRs—and without engaging in
the debate as to what they might mean or are intended to have the lower courts
do—attention here is limited almost entirely to those cases with GVR orders
directing reconsideration in light of a specific case as that type of GVR is by far
the predominant GVR type, although there are others (Bruhl calls them “nonstandard”).
First however, some words are necessary about the relationship between the
two practices of consolidation and GVR. While there continues to be GVRs based
on the Solicitor General’s brief or an intervening statute, there has been a particular
shift as to those cases GVR’d “for consideration in light of Jones v. Smith.” Those
“in light of [a case]” GVRs had been present earlier but only in small numbers. Of
course, there were also fewer cert petitions in earlier decades, so one would expect
more GVRs now simply because of the increase in petitions. The Court itself has
noted that earlier less frequent use of GVRs “may be explained in large part by the
smaller size of our certiorari docket in earlier times.”101 However, the increase in
such GVRs seems considerably greater than the growth of cert petitions can
account for. In a process in which growth feeds on itself, some of the increase in
cert petitions may itself result from the Court’s greater use of GVRs, as litigants
might file petitions in hopes of obtaining a “hold” for their cert petition and a
subsequent GVR.102
The growth in cert petitions means that there are more petitions the Court can
dispose of via GVRs after making decisions of the “lead” case on the issue. Some
98. Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court’s Second Thoughts: Remands for Reconsideration and Denials
of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 5–41 (1983); see also Hellman,
Granted, Vacated, and Remanded: Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court Practice, 67 JUDICATURE
389 (1984).
99. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs – And an Alternative, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 711 (2009).
100. Id. at 715.
101. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 166 (1996).
102. I appreciate Aaron Bruhl’s suggestion of this phenomenon.

99

2021 / Case Consolidation and GVRs in the Supreme Court
of the post-1980s shift may also be a result of the Court’s “shrunken docket,” the
smaller number of cases decided with published opinion. The Court may be
receiving more cases on any issue for which cert petitions are filed, with many of
those then disposed of with a GVR, as the Court decides a single (or “lead”) case
and then GVRs other cert petitions—indeed often many cert petitions. GVRs also
now seem to substitute—at least in part—for summary affirmances and reversals
in which the Court once regularly engaged and which it now rarely does—and not
simply because of the elimination of the “appeal” category, with almost everything
now coming to the Court on certiorari.
The two shifts—less consolidation, more GVRs—seem related and the two
changes interact. The “shrunken docket” means fewer cases decided with full
opinion, and it is more likely that the Court will decide only one case per issue and
send back related cases to the lower courts through the GVR process. If the Court
heard arguments for some GVR’d cases, they might well have consolidated those
cases with the initial single case decided on the issue. Conversely, with large
numbers of cases on an issue, to take one or two more to consolidate may not make
sense, as it may be easier to dispose the remainder of the petitions beyond the
“lead” case with GVR orders. If the issue is clear and clearly presented in the case
to which cert is granted, the perspective that other related cases might provide
would be less necessary.
B. About GVRs
Before turning to closer examination of the Court’s GVR practice, it is useful
to discuss GVRs somewhat further and to address what some judges have said
about them. Bruhl defined a GVR as “a summary disposition that, without
purporting to find any error, returns the case to the court below for further
consideration in light of [any] matter.”103 The “any matter” on which the present
study focuses are those cases remanded for reconsideration “in light of” a Supreme
Court ruling. However, not all GVRs are issued “in light of” a previous case. Cert
might be granted and the case remanded in light of an intervening event or the
Solicitor General’s position in that case, as when the Court, in light of a Solicitor
General memorandum, remanded a case to the district court to consider
defendant’s in forma pauperis application “after review of the full transcript of the
criminal trial.”104 Another reason for a GVR appeared when the Court GVR’d to
allow a defendant to have an attorney to challenge a district court ruling.105 GVRs
are also used to dispose of cases, as when they are remanded with instructions to
dismiss for mootness.106

103.
104.
(1957)).
105.
106.

100

Bruhl, supra note 99, at 717.
Delbridge v. United States, 354 U.S. 906, 906 (1957) (citing Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 550, 550 (1957).
See, e.g., United States v. Amarillo-Borger Express, and Ark. La. Mo. Ry. Co. v. Amarillo-Borger
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The Court might also tie a GVR order to an instruction to reconsider “in light
of” other elements, such as the Court’s “consideration of the entire record” and
confession of error by the Solicitor General, as occurred in the obscenity case of
Mounce v. United States,107 with Roth v. United States108 being the “in light of”
case. Although one might, however, compare that with a case from almost the same
time, the Roth-based reversal in Times Film Co. v. City of Chicago.109 There was
also a reversal on the basis of “consideration of the entire record” and the
government’s confession of error in cases following in Jencks ruling in October
1957.110 There could also be GVRs in light of an intervening statute, as when the
Court GVR’d Breaton v. United States111 in light of P.L. 86-20, which had become
law only two months earlier.
The GVRs of which one usually thinks, those remanding for reconsideration
in light of a specific earlier case, seem to leave matters open for the lower courts.
Indeed, the more GVRs, the greater the chance for those lower courts to evade the
“in light of” case. Remember, the Court also remands in many of the cases which
receive plenary treatment; the Court “reverses and remands” and “vacates and
remands,” and in those situations, while there is the Court’s opinion for the lower
court to apply, at times the Justices’ opinions are less than clear, leaving wiggle
room for the lower court, and it may be that the Supreme Court has not dealt with
some other issues decided below, as to which the lower court on remand may
adhere to its prior decision.
Although some observers argue that such GVR’s embody the Justices’ broad
hints to those lower courts, the Court can be more directive and close off avenues
that the lower court might otherwise take. When the Court accompanies a GVR
order with an instruction to reinstate the district court’s ruling112 or some other
instruction on the merits, that case—while in some ways a GVR and the Court so
indicates—might better be considered a summary reversal because the order goes
to the merits. In such an instance, in a GVR in which the remand was so that the
case would go to trial, the Court—while agreeing with the court of appeals as to
summary judgment (that it should have been denied)—remanded to clear away
what the court of appeals had said that the Justices thought it should not have
said.113 There are other instances in which a GVR contains a definite instruction:
in a desegregation case in the mid-1960s, the GVR order directed the district court

Express, both at 352 U.S. 1028 (1957).
107. 355 U.S. 180 (1957).
108. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
109. 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
110. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 657 (1957); see Scales v. United States, 355 U.S. 1, 1 (1957);
Lightfoot v. United States, 355 U.S. 2, 2 (1957).
111. 361 U.S. 117 (1959).
112. See, e.g., Wilson v. Simler, 350 U.S. 892, 893 (1955).
113. Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 352 U.S. 992, 992 (1957). Three justices dissented about the
additional language in the Court’s per curiam.
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“to enter a decree . . . in conformity with” an immediately-previous case.114
These directive GVRs come close to the Court’s practice—clearly evident in
the late 1950s—of issuing orders, not unlike summary reversals, that might be
called GVRRs—of granting cert, reversing, and remanding. This occurred, for
example, in United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mgfr. Co.,115 in which the
Court granted cert, reversed, and remanded in light of the week-old Lincoln Mills
case116 and thus fitting the pattern of GVRs coming soon after decision of the lead
case. Similar is Carr v. Beverly Hills Corp.,117 a reversal based on two cases from
a week earlier.118 Or the Court might order a case “remanded for trial,” as in both
Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line RR Co. and Futrelle v. Atlantic Coast Line RR Co.119
In the former, the Justices granted cert “limited to that part of the judgment in favor
of Southern Railway Company” and said “that part of the judgment is reversed and
the cause is remanded for trial.” The Court cited the recently decided Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R Co.120 in support of its ruling. Related to remanding for trial
was the issuance of a GVR “for consideration on the merits,” as the Court did in
November 1956, citing United States v. Hayman,121 with each of two cases from
different circuits.122 In these situations, the Court has decided not only that its new
case applies to the lower court ruling but also has made error of it, and the Justices
do so rather than using a full GVR under which the Justices would have the lower
court take first crack at applying the new Supreme Court decision.
What can be said about the cases in light of which the Court GVRs? Overall,
the GVR “in light of cases” most often appear almost immediately—a week later
or sometimes only a few days—after the lead decision, as the Court disposes of
petitions it holds for decision on the case for which it grants review. Indeed, the
Court may bunch GVRs immediately after the lead ruling. At other times the Court
spaces out GVRs and may take some time before disposing all the cert petitions
from cases the lead decision potentially affects, leaving an extended “tail” of GVRs
from a case. One reason for the extension is that litigants file petitions immediately
after a key ruling, hoping the Court will GVR their case. Some time will also likely
pass between when the Court files the lead case and the GVRs deriving from it.
And particularly when the Court decides a case at the very end of Term in June,
instead of releasing the resulting GVRs then, the GVRs may not appear until the

114. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 379, 379 (1956), decided Nov. 7, 1965, to be made congruent
with Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1956), decided the same day.
115. 354 U.S. 906 (1957).
116. Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
117. 354 U.S. 917 (1957).
118. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957); Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S 114 (1957).
119. Shaw v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 920 (1957); Futrelle v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 353 U.S.
920 (1957).
120. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
121. 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1952).
122. Jordan v. United States, 352 U.S. 904 (D.C. Cir. 1956); McGann v. United States, 352 U.S. 904 (2d
Cir. 1956).
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beginning of the next Term. As an example, after the Court decided Reed v. Town
of Gilbert,123 on municipal restrictions on signs, on June 18, 2015, two GVRs in
light of that case appeared roughly ten days later, on June 29,124 but another GVR
in light of that case then appeared on October 5, 2015, the next Term’s “first
Monday in October.”125 There may, however, be a gap of some magnitude between
the lead case and GVR, as could be seen when, on November 14, 1955, the Court
GVR’d for further proceedings,126 citing two cases from 1944 and one from
1952.127
Contemporary GVRs, in addition to following quickly upon the heels of the
“in light of” case, tend to be based on only a single case. Yet in the late 1950s, as
a previous example also shows, the Court, in issuing a GVR order, might include
more than one case for the lower Court to consider on remand. Thus, in Hill v.
United States,128 the GVR was in light of Ellis v. United States,129 decided a week
earlier, “and also” in light of two earlier cases of varying vintage from the previous
Term, Farley v. United States130 and Johnson v. United States.131 Two weeks later,
the Court also GVR’d another case132 in light of Ellis while adding Hill.133 Farley
and Johnson also became the basis of a GVR to give petitioner “an opportunity to
substantive his allegations.”134
While a GVR’d case may have arisen in a court other than the one from which
the lead (“in light of”) case came to the Court, a GVR order may be directed to the
very court which had produced the lead case. This is likely the result of cert having
been sought from a particular court in several cases raising the same issue, with
the Justices, having selected one case, then GVR the others. This phenomenon was
seen frequently in later years as the Court received more cert petitions, making it
more likely the Court would receive multiple petitions raising the same question,
but there is an instance in O.T. 1957, when the justices GVR’d Ross v. Schneckloth
and Woods v. Rhay,135 from the Supreme Court of Washington, in light of the twoweek-earlier Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Pardons,136
which had come from the same court.
123. 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
124. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015); Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, 136 S. Ct.
2888 (2015).
125. Herson v. City of Richmond, 136 S. Ct. 46, 46 (2015).
126. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 842, 842 (1955).
127. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210 (1944);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
128. 356 U.S. 704 (1958)
129. 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
130. 354 U.S. 521 (1957).
131. 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
132. Cash v. United States, 357 U.S. 219 (1978).
133. What is puzzling is that Hill itself was a GVR, to the same court, so it is a GVR in light of a GVR.
134. Edwards v. United States, 355 U.S. 36, 36 (1957).
135. Ross v. Schneckloth, 357 U.S. 575 (1978); Woods v. Rhay, 357 U.S. 575 (1978).
136. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).

103

2021 / Case Consolidation and GVRs in the Supreme Court
Multiple GVRs on cert petitions from the same court as the lead case are not
uncommon. They result because that lower court has, after deciding the case which
prompted the granted cert petition, applied that ruling to its own later cases, and
cert has been sought to raise the same issue as in the initial petition. As the Court
itself has noted, in addition to situations in which the Supreme Court case came
after a lower court decision, GVRs are also used when the relevant Supreme Court
decision was issued shortly before the lower court ruled so that the latter could not
apply it. Indeed, some decisions antedating the key ruling may have been brought
up on cert and those petitions may have been pending when the Supreme Court
accepted what would become the lead case. When a GVR order is directed to the
court whose ruling led to the Court’s decision, the GVR may also serve a purpose
equivalent to the petitioner’s filing a second PFR in the court of appeals on the
basis of the Court’s new ruling or the lower court’s granting a rehearing sua sponte.
It is part of the process by which the lower courts clean up their circuit law in the
aftermath of Supreme Court decisions.
If the GVRs that come very shortly after a specific lead case are for cert
petitions in cases from the court which decided the lead case, those cases might be
independent of each other, but more likely they are related in some way, likely as
part of a set of cases on an issue decided below. They result from multiple cert
petitions from the same multi-party case but the Supreme Court had not
consolidated them with the lead case; or they may have been non-precedential
(“unpublished) rulings based on the circuit precedent that became the lead “in light
of”) case taken and decided by the Supreme Court.
When the GVR is instead from another court, it is most likely that the cert
petition, involving the same issue as the lead case, was simply held until the Court
ruled in the lead case. Multiple GVRs from individual other courts result because
those courts had been “going their own way” and following their own precedents
when the Supreme Court granted review in a case from another court, something
particularly likely when an inter-circuit split has developed but the Justices are not
yet ready to grant review to resolve it. The result can be a “pile-up” of cases for
the Court to resolve after it issues the lead decision—with immediate resolution
taking the form of multiple GVRs to courts that have decided related cases. Some
GVRs in cases from the same circuit as the lead case will be GVR’d quickly—
with some coming almost immediately, that is, within a week—showing that they
have been held until decision of the primary case, the one to which cert was
granted. (It has been said, “We regularly hold cases that involve the same issue as
a case in which certiorari has been granted and plenary review is being conducted
in order that . . they may be ‘GVR’d when the case is decided.”).137 Others further
back in the “tail” of GVRs after the case is decided may not have been reached in
the cert process so these new cases are GVR’d. “Trailer” cases may be those

137. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 177 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting); Stutson v. United States, 516
U.S. 163, 177 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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decided under now rejected circuit precedent and which are now working their way
up to the Supreme Court.
Bruhl recognized that cert petitions leading to GVRs come at different times
in relation to the Court’s decision in the lead case, as well as in relation to the
Court’s granting of cert in that case.138 He created three categories: petitions filed
before the Court granted cert to what would become what is being called here the
lead case, which had denominated “pre-grant petitions”; those filed after cert was
granted, called “post-grant petitions”; and those filed after the decision itself, or
“post-decision petitions.”139
In a less visible aspect of the interaction between lower courts and the Supreme
Court, the need for GVRs may be at least somewhat reduced if a lower court—
learning that a cert petition on the issue before it has been filed from another court
or that the Supreme Court has granted review to a case raising the issue the lower
court is confronting—suspends action in a case until the Supreme Court either
denies review without addressing the issue at interest or decides the case to which
review has been granted. This lower court suspension of activity in the face of
potential Supreme Court action is “anticipatory compliance.” If, however, the
lower courts do not wait in the face of possible or likely Supreme Court action but
instead proceed to decide a case and file the opinion on the issues the Justices are
considering, more GVRs are likely to result when the cert petitions from those
rulings reach the Supreme Court.140
C. What the Justices Say About GVRs
What—if anything—has the Court said about usage of GVRs? Some Justices
have engaged in disputation about GVRs, but that has been rare. And for the
Justices to refer to the Court’s GVR in its opinions is rarer still. However, in a
recent case, concerning the “residual clause” of Sec. 16(b) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act after the Court’s earlier invalidation in Johnson v. United
States141 of a similar clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, Justice Kagan—
writing for the Court—reported that “while some of those ACCA suits were
pending before us, we received a number of petitions for certiorari presenting
related issues in the § 16(b) context. And after issuing the relevant ACCA
decisions, we vacated the judgments in those § 16(b) cases and remanded them for
further consideration.”142

138. Bruhl, supra note 99, at 741.
139. Id.
140. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes the
Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 203 (2011) (discussing whether lower courts should proceed
and when change may be in the offing or should wait).
141. 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015).
142. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1222–23 (2018); id. at 1223 n.13 (providing a list of those
cases).
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In issuing its simple GVR orders, the Court almost invariably says nothing one
way or the other about the implications of its order as to what the lower court
should do on remand. Only seldom does it do so, leaving it to others to divine
whether a GVR means no more than what it says: that the lower court should
“consider” the case a-new or whether it is more like a directive pointing to having
the lower court reverse its now-vacated earlier ruling, as would seem to be obvious
when a GVR’d case has come from the same court whose rule the Justices have
overturned.
In a recent instance in which a Justice underscored that in issuing a GVR case
the Court was not speaking one way or the other to case outcomes, Justice Alito—
in a long series of at least three dozen cases with GVR orders on the basis of
Johnson v. United States143 in which he had dissented—explained that, on the
Solicitor General’s suggestion, the many cases had been held by the Court until
Johnson itself was decided. He then explained that in this slew (my word, not his)
of GVRs, “the Court has not differentiated between cases in which the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if the Court held (as it now has) that the residual clause
of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 . . . is void for vagueness and cases in
which relief would not be warranted for a procedural reason.”144 Thus, he added,
the lower court “should understand that the Court’s disposition of this petition does
not reflect any view regarding petitioner’s entitlement to relief.”
In the early period examined in this study, there were some dissents to GVR
orders, but they have seldom been seen in recent times. Just as Justices who vote
to grant certiorari most often do not note their dissent when certiorari is denied, so
Justices who disagreed with a GVR order seldom reveal that disagreement in the
reports. Seldom—but not never—as from time to time there has been a flare-up
within the Court over GVRs and their purported misuse. Justice Scalia was the
most outspoken in this regard, but Justices Alito and Thomas seem to be the present
standard-bearer for those who would limit the frequency and use of GVRs.
Two 1996 GVRs led to an extensive exchange between Justice Scalia—
objecting to extensive use of GVRs—and the Court’s other Justices. In those cases,
the competing sides went well beyond disputing whether GVR was appropriate in
those cases to a full-blown debate on GVR use. In Lawrence v. Chater,145 upon a
suggestion by the Solicitor General, the Court GVR’d in light of a new statutory
interpretation by the Commissioner of Social Security. In the face of the Scalia
dissent, the Justices—in an extended per curiam—stated the rationale for use of
the GVR, extolled the virtue of that use, and talked about when a GVR would be
“inappropriate.” While acknowledging that “a large proportion” of GVRs fit in
three categories to which Scalia would have limited their use, the Justices found
both those categories were “too narrow” as Scalia interpreted them and found his

143. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
144. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2924, 2924 (2015).
145. 516 U.S. 163 (1996).
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approach “too restrictive.”146 The Court then applied its discussion from Lawrence
to a criminal case, Stutsun v. United States,147 issuing a GVR order because:
[T]his is a case where (1) the prevailing party below, the Government, has
now repudiated the legal position that it advanced below; (2) the only
opinion below did not consider the import of a recent Supreme Court
precedent that both parties now agree applies; (3) the Court of Appeals
summarily affirmed that decision; (4) all six Courts of Appeals that have
addressed the applicability of the Supreme Court decision that the District
Court did not apply in this case have concluded that it applies to Rule 4
cases; and (5) the petitioner is in jail having, through no fault of his own,
had no plenary consideration of his appeal.148
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, issued a dissent applicable to both
cases. As the majority described his views, Scalia would have limited GVRs to
three categories: “(1) where an intervening factor has arisen that has a legal bearing
upon the decision”; where clarification of the lower court’s ruling was necessary,
for procedural reasons; and (3) in confession of error situations.149 Scalia asserted
that the present GVRs—which he called “no fault V[acate] & R[emand]”—were
“improper extensions of our limited power to vacate without finding error
below.”150 He found that the Court had imposed no limit on its use of GVR—
although the Lawrence per curiam certainly suggests otherwise. He explored the
situations (or categories of cases) in which the Court had come to use GVRs and
then asserted that Lawrence and Stutson “come within none of these categories of
‘no-fault V&R,’ not even the questionable . . . one”151 (in which the Solicitor
General said a ground below was mistaken). Then, after parsing at length the
Court’s use of GVRs in the two cases, he complained not only that the Court’s
action in these cases “extends our prior practice just a little bit,” but he also
expressed dismay at the majority’s “expansive expression of the authority that
supports those judgments;” he said the Court admitted to neither constitutional or
“any prudential restraint.”152 Speaking of the Court’s new/expanded practice, he
said that “innovation cannot be limitless without altering the nature of the power
conferred.”
Ten years after the Lawrence/Stutson controversy, the Court—in its per curiam
in Youngblood v. West Virginia153—GVR’d to allow the lower court to examine
the defendant’s claim of a Brady violation, which the Court said had not been
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 169.
516 U.S. 193 (1996).
Id. at 195.
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. at 168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 190.
547 U.S. 867 (2006) (per curiam).
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addressed below;154 it thus used what was then a forty-plus-year-old case as the
basis for the lower court’s reconsideration. Justice Scalia dissented, again stating
his dismay at the Court’s further expansion of GVR.155 Bruhl—who called
attention to this case—referred to this type of GVR as an “antecedent-event GVR,”
one in which an event already on the books when the lower court decided the case
was used as the basis for the GVR.156
In two cases only a few years later, Justice Scalia—this time alone—again
spoke out while dissenting from GVR orders. Both dissents were nowhere near as
extensive as those in Lawrence/Stutson, and each was more focused on the specific
GVR order at hand. Yet, he again moved beyond the specifics to a more general
complaint. In Webster v. Cooper,157 his beef was that the “in light of” case was
decided well before (“more than two months”) the lower court rulings and thus
could not appropriately be an “intervening factor” that could properly serve as the
basis for a GVR.158 Moreover, because the petitioner had not invoked below the
relevant court case, the Court’s GVR action was giving petitioner another
opportunity to raise a matter foregone below. This led Scalia to complain that “we
are developing a new system in which all arguably valid points not raised and not
discussed below . . . will be sent back for a redo by the Court.”159
In Wellons v. Hall,160 Scalia pressed the Court for “outdo[ing] itself” even
under the “flabby standard” he had earlier protested, in which the Court would
GVR—here quoting from Lawrence—on “a reasonable probability that the
decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the
opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that such a
redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation.”161 In the
present case, he said, other grounds supported the lower court decision, so the GVR
would have no effect. Thus, he asserted, “The power to ‘revise and correct for
error,’ which the Court has already turned into ‘a power to void for suspicion,’ . . .
has now become the power to send back for a redo,” which he called part of “[t]he
systematic degradation of our traditional requirements for a GVR.”162

154. Id. at 867.
155. Id. at 871–75.
156. Bruhl, supra note 99, at 727 (2009) (describing one of two categories of GVRs that Bruhl called
“controversial,” the other being GVRs based on the government’s confession of error).
157. 558 U.S. 1039 (2009), GVR’d in light of Jimenez v. Quarterman, 553 U.S. 113 (2009).
158. Webster, 558 U.S. at 1039.
159. Id.
160. 558 U.S. 220, 227–28 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting), GVR’d in light of Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449
(2010).
161. Wellons, 558 U.S. at 225.
162. Id. at 227–28.
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D. GVRs Term-by-Term.
Although many examples provided thus far have been drawn from the latter
half of the 1950s, attention now turns more specifically to the patterns in each of
the Terms in this study, starting with that earlier period before moving on to Terms
of Court from the mid-1980s onward.
1. O.T. 1956-1960.
In the 1956 Term, there was one set of GVRs—five cases remanded in light of
two of that year’s “Communist cases”—plus one single-case GVR sent back in
light of another of those cases. The five-GVR set came at Term’s end, a week after
the Watkins and Sweezey decisions,163 the “in light of “ cases the lower courts were
to consider.164 Some of these cases were to reappear in the Supreme Court after
remand and be part of the Court’s withdrawal from its earlier position after the
narrow defeat of the jurisdiction-stripping Jenner-Butler bills.165 In that Term, the
only other standard GVR “in light of X case” had been issued a month earlier, in
light of Konigsberg v. State Bar of California and Schware v. Bar Examiners of
New Mexico.166
In the 1957 Term, no one previous case led to a large number of GVRs; instead,
a number of separate cases each led to one or two such orders. The Term’s GVRs
tended to come at the first part of the Term, based on rulings from the previous
Term167 or at the end in June shortly after new Court rulings.168 One came on the
same day as the lead case, so noted in both the GVR order and the dissent.169 On
the same day, the Court issued a summary reversal also based on “decided this
day” cases,170 perhaps indicating the relatively small space between a summary
decision on the merits and a GVR.

163. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
164. Raley v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 929 (1957); Flaxer v. United States, 354 U.S. 929 (1957); Barenblatt v.
United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957); Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958); Morgan v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 929
(1957).
165. See, e.g., Barenblatt, 354 U.S. at 930; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
166. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Bar Exam’r of N.M., 353 U.S. 232
(1957); In re Patterson, 353 U.S. 952 (1957).
167. E.g., McCrary v. Aladdin Indus., 355 U.S. 8 (Oct. 14, 1957), in light of Teamsters v. Kerrigan Iron
Works, 343 U.S. 968 (1957); Watson v. United States, 355 U.S. 14 (Oct. 14, 1957), in light of Service v. Dulles,
354 U.S. 363 (1957).
168. E.g., Hill v. United States, 356 U.S. 704 (June 2, 1958) (per curiam), in light of Ellis v. United States,
356 U.S. 614 (May 26, 1958) (per curiam), in light of Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 (1957) and Johnson
v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
169. Joines v. United States, 357 U.S. 573 (June 30, 1958), GVR’d to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in light of Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (June 30, 1958), “decided this day,” with dissents noted by Justices
Burton and Clark, on the basis of their Jones dissent.
170. First Methodist Church of San Leandro v. Horstmann, 357 U.S. 368 (1958) (reaching reversal on the
basis of First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. County of L.A., 357 U.S. 548 (1958) and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958), with Justice Clark dissenting, referring to is dissents in those cases))).
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In the 1958 Term, there was only an occasional or infrequent GVR “in light
of” a case, along with some on the basis of the Solicitor General’s position.171 The
thin line separating summary rulings and GVRs continued, as could be seen in
cases disposed of on the basis of San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon.172 Garmon
came down on April 20, 1959; two weeks later, on May 4, the Court GVR’d a case
in light of it.173 Although the case had been brought as an appeal, the Court treated
it as a certiorari case and then gave it the GVR treatment. Only two weeks later,
on May 18, the Court summarily reversed a judgment on the basis of Garmon.174
So one sees both types of dispositions shortly after decision in the lead case.
Another summary disposition that came a week after the lead case was E.T. & N.C.
Transportation Co. v. Curre,175 affirmed with a citation to Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota/Williams v. Stockham Valve & Fittings,176 with
three Justices (Frankfurter, Whittaker, and Stewart) dissenting based on their
earlier dissents.
The 1959 Term had only a handful of GVRs—and not a large handful at that
(just over a half-dozen)—and of those, one was in light of a statute177 and another,
while “in light of” a case, came at the Solicitor General’s suggestion.178 There was
also a GVR with a remand to an administrative agency;179 another remand directly
to a district court;180 and a remand in light of cases from several Terms earlier.181
There were also some “standard” GVRs—that is—those in light of a specific,
recently-decided case, with the “lead” case handed down a week earlier in one
instance and in another to a case decided the same day.182
October Term 1960 had two GVRs in light of legislation or legislative
action,183 one of which was the case that was to become the Court’s School Prayer
171. WIRL Television Corp. v. United States, 358 U.S. 52 (1958) (material in brief) and WORZ v. FCC,
358 U.S. 55 (1958) (material in brief), and Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States & FCC, 358 U.S.
49 (1958) (describing representations about legislative testimony given after a U.S. court of appeals ruling).
172. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
173. Grocery Drivers Union Local 848 v. Seven Up Bottling Co. Of L.A., 359 U.S. 434 (1959).
174. De Vries v. Baumgartner’s Elec. Constr., 359 U.S. 498 (1959).
175. 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
176. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
177. Breaton v. United States, 361 U.S. 117 (1959).
178. McAbee v. United States, 361 U.S. 537 (1960).
179. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of State of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 361 U.S. 195 (1959).
180. United States ex rel. Poret v. Warden, 361 U.S. 375 (1960).
181. Smith v. United States, 361 U.S. 13 (1959).
182. United R.R. Workers Div. of Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. B & O R.R. Co., 369 U.S. 270 (June
27, 1960), in light of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 363 U.S. 528 (June 20,
1960); Camara v. United States, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), in light of Ellem v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)
(both June 27, 1960).
183. See All Am. Airways v. United Air Lines, 364 U.S. 297 (1960) (reaching GVR “with instructions to
retain jurisdiction until such time as further legislation has been enacted or Public Law 86-661, 74 Stat. 527, has
expired”); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960) (reaching same result and
remanding “for such proceedings as may be appropriate in light of Act. No. 100 of the Laws of the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, passed at the Session of 1959 and approved by the Governor
. . . on December 17, 1979”).
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Case;184 and another, to a state high court, was for “clarification.”185 These were in
addition to eight “standard” GVRs, one of which was a remand to the Second
Circuit, which was instructed to remand to a regulatory agency.186 The other
“standard” GVRs appeared both at the beginning of the Term (two in October), the
middle (one in February based on a January decision),187 and then the remainder
in the last part of the Term—one in May, in light of an April case, and four in June
with two of the latter GVRs coming on the same day as the ruling on which they
were based.188 One of these late-in-Term GVRs came from a rehearing petition;
the Court denied cert, but on petition for rehearing the Court substituted a GVR
for its earlier cert denial.189
Some other observations about the Court’s GVR practice in the latter half of
the 1950s are in order. For one, the Court frequently used summary dispositions
on the merits—often reversals—in part as a function of the presence of many cases
that came to the justices on appeal, which required a disposition of this sort. There
were summary affirmances as well as reversals, also seen in the aftermath of
Brown v. Board of Education, when the Court dealt with desegregation of
Montgomery’s buses in Gayle v. Browder190 by affirming with citations to Brown,
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson,191 and Holmes v. City of
Atlanta.192 The elimination of most three-judge district courts in 1978 and of the
remainder of the Supreme Court’s mandatory docket—its appeal category—in
1988 meant there was no need— that is, no legal requirement—for disposition on
the merits, allowing the Court to use cert denials instead—although given the
decreased docket of cases with published opinion one would certainly think
Justices had adequate time to dispose of at least some cases in this fashion rather
than denying cert. Use of cert denials instead of GVRs was at times a matter of
disagreement within the Court. For example, when the Court in Johnson v. Union
Pacific P.R. Co.193 reversed the Ninth Circuit on the basis of an Idaho decision,194

184. Abington School District v. Schempp, 394 U.S. 203 (1963).
185. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz. v. Murray Cnty. of Tex., 364 U.S. 289 (1960) (citing Minnesota v. Nat’l
Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940)).
186. Local 553, Teamsters, v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 763 (1961) (remanding in light of Local 357, Teamsters v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), decided six weeks earlier)).
187. NLRB v. Celanese Corp. Of Am., 365 U.S. 297 (Feb. 20, 1961) (remanding in light of NLRB v.
Mattison Mach. Workers, 365 U.S. 123 (Jan. 23, 1961)).
188. Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Schlude, 367 U.S. 911 (June 19, 1961) (reaching GVR in light of
AAA v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (June 19, 1961)); Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Milwaukie Suburban
Transp. Corp., 367 U.S. 906 (1961) (reaching the same result in light of both AAA and United States v. Consol.
Edison of N.Y., 366 U.S. 80 (1961), decided a month earlier).
189. Conner v. Simler, 367 U.S. 486 (1961), GVR’d to the Tenth Circuit in light of an Oklahoma case.
190. 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
191. 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
192. 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
193. 352 U.S. 957 (1957).
194. Russell v. City of Idaho, 305 P.2d 740 (Idaho, 1956).
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four Justices would not have granted cert, but upon cert being granted, they would
have GVR’d in light of that ruling.
In the “standard” GVRs of those days in light of a case, the Court’s form of
order was not invariably that to which we are now accustomed. At times, the Court
did more than point to the already-decided case on the basis of which there should
be reconsideration—that is, it went beyond the “reconsideration in light of”
language. In one instance,195 the Court remanded to the district court for retrial,
specifying that trial was to be “on the admiralty side,” and citing a case on that
point196 before noting the “in light of” case.197 Another slightly different form was
in Townsend v. Sain,198 granting cert, vacating the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, and
remanding, not saying “for consideration in light of” but citing the two-month-old
ruling in United States ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen.199
When cases that will be GVR’d arrive at the Supreme Court on certiorari from
a U.S. court of appeals, the Court in its earlier practice did not always simply
remand to that court—which in turn might remand to the district court or to the
agency where the case originated. At times, the Justices remanded to the district
courts, thus “skipping a step,” as they did in remanding a Fifth Circuit case directly
to the district court “for disposition of the question whether members of
petitioner’s race were deliberately and intentionally limited and excluded in the
selection of petit jury panel in violation of the Federal Constitution.”200 Or they
might remand to an agency or at least direct such a remand. One such case was
Public Service Commission of State of New York v. Federal Power Commission /
United Gas Improvement v. F.P.C.,201 GVR’d to the Third Circuit to be remanded
to the Federal Power Commission in light of a case from the prior term.202
We can also learn about earlier practice by seeing what took place after a major
ruling that would have affected large numbers of cases in the pipeline held for
decision of the lead case. Miranda v. Arizona203 provides such an instance. So
might Miranda’s precursor. After Escobedo v. Illinois,204 hundreds of petitions
arrived at the Court that implicated Escobedo, including possible extension (that
became Miranda). Chief Justice Warren “directed his law clerks to segregate all
the Escobedo cases on the docket,”205 and from that pool, the Court fished the cases
to be decided, then consolidated them to become what we know as Miranda.
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Escobedo does not appear to have been followed by GVRs. More important,
nor did they appear following Miranda. The point is made clear in a series of some
60 cases disposed of by cert denial, but in which Justice Douglas noted that he
would have granted certiorari and GVR’s in light of Miranda. This also illustrates
the previously noted disagreement over whether to grant (or deny) cert or instead
to GVR. In a few cases, Douglas would have granted cert and either: reversed
outright on the basis of Miranda,206 or affirmed finding “no violation of Miranda
principle.”207 In others, he observed that it was impossible to say from the record
that Miranda’s principles were not violated,208 or—more strongly—that it was
clear from the record that its principles were not applied.209 As will be seen, in
current times—as in after the Booker sentencing case—the Court would likely
have GVR’d most if not all of them. One reason it might not have done so in the
immediate aftermath of Miranda is that the Court had not yet committed to the
retroactive application of new criminal procedure rules, so the only outcome—for
the other Justices, at least—was to deny certiorari.
2. The Late 1970s
The late 1970s were not included in this study, but Bruhl has provided data
for O.T. 1975–O.T. 1979, indicating the total number of GVRs for each Term and
then the number of “non-standard” GVRs, that is, those not in light of a specific
case. The number of total GVRs per Term varied from a low of fifty (O.T. 1977)
to a high of ninety-one (O.T. 1976), and the numbers bounced up and down: 56–
91–50–68–87.210 The number of “non-standard” GVRs decreased from twenty-two
(O.T. 1976) to five and seven (O.T. 78 and O.T. 79), leaving between forty (O.T.
77) and eighty (O.T. 79) GVRs in light of a specific case. Bruhl’s observation that
“pro-defendant criminal procedure and sentencing rulings tend to generate the
biggest booms”211 was to be born out in later years, especially as to sentencing.
3. 2000 Onward
a. From Before O.T. 2000 Through O.T. 2005.
Bruhl has provided data for O.T. 1996–O.T. 2006, at the core of his study.212
That is presented before the present study turns to more intensive Term-by-Term
examination starting with O.T. 2000. Close attention is given to more than simply
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See California v. Flores, 384 U.S. 1010 (1966), and California v. Furnish, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
See Sullins v. California, 384 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1966).
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the number of GVRs, in order to include, for example, time between lead case and
GVRs.
For the four Terms O.T. 1996–O.T. 1999, there are fewer GVRs than for the
just-discussed late 1970s, with never more than 50 “standard” (in light of a case)
GVRs per term. In O.T. 2000, Bruhl records 61 standard GVRs along with—as
was his practice with criminal cases producing a large volume of GVR—50 GVRs
based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, for a total over 111, providing further evidence
for the statement that “the number of GVRs varies substantially from year to
year,”213 even with the exclusion of such major generators of GVRs as United
States v. Booker214 and Cunningham v. California,215 to be discussed infra.
According to Bruhl, the number of standard GVRs dropped from the over 100
GVRs in O.T. 2000 to 56 the following Term, to 40 in O.T. 2001, and to 37 in O.T.
2001 before rising to 57 in O.T. 2004, along with an amazing 740 Booker-based
GVRs—to which one must add 37 such GVRs the following Term. For O.T. 2005,
Bruhl’s data then reveals only 44 standard non-Booker GVRs in O.T. 2005, with
an increase to 63 in O.T. 2006 to which must be added approximately 200 GVRs
based on Cunningham.
By O.T. 2000216 the Court had begun to GVR cases frequently, doing so 109
times that Term in light of 31 different cases, plus more than 50 cases GVR’d in
light of Apprendi v. New Jersey,217 the first of several rulings requiring that juries—
not judges—make fact determinations affecting sentences. In some instances, there
is but one case GVR’d in light of the lead case, as in the first GVR of the term
from October 2, Adler v. Duval County School Board,218 GVR’d in light of Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe,219 decided at the very end of the previous
Term; or the late February 2001 Interactive Flight Technologies v. Swissair Swiss
Air Transport,220 GVR’d in light Green Tree Financail Corp. Alabama v.
Randolph,221 decided the previous December, thus indicating a slight lag between
lead case and GVR.
Often the GVR ruling was released very soon—a week or less—after the lead
case was filed, as when Daniels v. United States,222 decided on April 25, 2001, was
the basis for the April 30, 2001 GVR of United States v. Clark;223 or when PGA
Tour v. Martin,224 decided May 29, 2001, was the basis on June 4 for the GVR
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order in Olinger v. U.S. Golf Association.225 At the end of the Term, the time
between release of the lead case and GVR might be less, such as the GVR in
McQueen v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control,226
filed one day after Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,227 the “in light of” case. The close
relationship between a lead case and those GVR’d in light of it could also be seen
in a set of cases—all from the Ninth Circuit—involving Circuit City Stores, in
which, having decided one on the merits on March 21, 2001,228 the Court GVR’d
three others five days later.229
When—as in these instances—the Court held related cert petitions for
decision, it quite obviously made its GVR decision(s) along with the decision in
the lead case. Thus, any difference in date of release is accounted for by Court
practice in releasing Orders Lists, including the GVRs, separately from release of
opinions. When a GVR “lagged” the lead case by a greater period of time, this was
likely the result of cert petitions arriving for—or being held for—decision after the
lead case was decided. An instance of the latter is the GVR order in Rapanos v.
United States230 in light of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army
Corps of Engineers,231 decided on January 9, 2001, while the GVR did not come
until June 18. The other three GVRs on that date were all in light of cases a week
earlier and each was GVR’d in light of a single case.232
While the most frequent situation is one in which a lead case resulted in a
single GVR, a lead case may result in multiple GVRs, ranging from several to a “a
whole lot.” Thus in O.T. 2000, while the great majority of lead cases led to only a
single GVR or perhaps two,233 there were cases resulting in three (from the Circuit
City Stores case234) or five (from I.N.S. v. St. Cyr235) to as many as ten (Artuz v.
Bennett)236 or twelve (Zadyvas v. Davis237). But the greatest number by far was the
more than 50 GVRs stemming from Apprendi. In the latter situation, not
surprisingly, the GVRs took place shortly after the lead case was filed but they
were spread over an extended period. The Court decided Apprendi on June 26,

225. 532 U.S. 1054 (2001).
226. 533 U.S. 943 (2001).
227. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
228. Cir. City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
229. Cir. City Stores v. Ahmed, Cir. City Stores v. Ingle, and Circuit Stores v. Al-Safin, all at 532 U.S.
938 (2001).
230. 533 U.S. 913 (2001).
231. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
232. Acker v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (2001) (reaching GVR in light of Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001) and Campbell v. St. Tammany’s Sch. Bd., 533 U.S. 913 (2001), in light of Good News Club v.
Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 96 (2001)))).
233. E.g., Houston v. Kilpatrick and Booker v. Ward, both 531 U.S. 1108 (2001) (reaching GVR in light
of Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001)).
234. Adams, 532 U.S. at 105.
235. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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237. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

115

2021 / Case Consolidation and GVRs in the Supreme Court
2000, at the very end of the Term. That Term saw only one GVR based on it in the
same Term, on June 29, followed by four (from three circuits) on the next Term’s
first day (October 2, 2001, then two on each of the next five days announcing
orders before four (again, from three circuits) on November 27. January and
February 2001, saw larger clumps—ten on January 8 (from four circuits and one
state court) and nine on February 20 (four circuits) before tailing off to one each
on four days in March through May. This illustrates again that if the decision in
light of which a case is GVR’d for reconsideration comes at Term’s end, the
resulting GVRs may not appear until the beginning of the next Term, at “first
Monday” and/or thereafter.
In addition to straightforward GVRs, there were some dispositions that were
not clean GVRs but which seem related. In one, the Court said it had reversed the
judgment in a separate case,238 then, without saying it was vacating the lower court
judgment, granted cert and remanded for further proceedings.239 In another, after
affirming in part and remanding in part in Whitman v. American Trucking,240 the
Court remanded two cases to the D.C. Circuit “for further proceedings.”241
If Apprendi produced a sizeable number of GVRs in O.T. 2000, the next ruling
on judges or juries making certain findings, Blakely v. Washington,242 did not,
although its subject-matter could have been expected to produce numerous GVRs.
Blakely was decided at the end of the 2003 Term, on June 24, and it resulted in
only one GVR four days later, to the Supreme Court of Oregon.243
That, however, is the “calm before the storm,” as on January 12 of the next
Term, the Court decided United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan,244 a
combination of case-consolidation and GVR-generation. Booker was the
blockbuster case leading to GVRs and it was also illustrative of the possible length
of a GVR “tail.” By the end of O.T. 2004, in which the Court decided Booker, and
the following O.T. 2005, the Court had issued almost 800 such dispositions. The
Booker GVRs started almost two weeks after the decision, when, beginning with
Meza v. United States,245 400 GVRs based on Booker were handed down on
January 24, 2005. The next five Orders days added another more than 200, and the
next nine Orders days produced yet another 135 GVRs, with 34, 36, and 26,
respectively, on April 25, May 2, and May 6, then only 12 on June 6 and 4–6 on
each of June 13, 20, and 27, accumulating a total of 744 during that Term. But

238. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 14 (2000).
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241. Massachusetts v. Am. Trucking Ass’n and Am. Lung Ass’n v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, both at 532 U.S.
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242. 542 U.S. 296 (2000).
243. Dilts v. Oregon, 542 U.S. 934 (2004).
244. 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Fanfan, 558 F.3d 105 (2009).
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wait! The flow did not end there but only went on summer recess with the Court.
On the first day of the next Term, October 3, 2005, there were another twenty-nine,
accumulated over the summer. The next week (October 11, 2005), there were five
more, but after that, only another scattered six.
If we put aside the extremely high number of GVRs resulting from the Booker
decision, what else of note took place in O.T. 2003? One case, Norton v. Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance,246 which had come from the Tenth Circuit, led to three
GVRs, one from the same circuit247 and two from the Ninth Circuit,248 and another
case from the Ninth Circuit249 resulted in four GVRs a week later in three cases
from the Second Circuit and one from the D.C. Circuit.
Explosive as Booker was in producing GVRs, it was hardly the only O.T 2004
ruling to lead the Court to GVR cases. Indeed, there were sixty-two such cases, in
light of thirty-two rulings (Booker included). As usual, in the largest number of
instances, a lead ruling led to only one GVR. However, there were a number of
lead cases resulting in more than one GVR: seven cases produced two and another
three cases led to three GVRs each. Gonzales v. Raich250 was the “in light of” case
in three GVRs (two to the Ninth Circuit, from which Gonzalez had come and one
to the Fifth Circuit), but in one,251 the GVR was also in light of the previous Term’s
Tennessee v. Lane.252
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association253 led to five GVRs of cases from
three other circuits—the Third (two), Fifth (one), and Sixth (two) Circuits. Roper
v. Simmons,254 on imposition of the death penalty to those under eighteen years of
age at the time of commission of their crime, which had come from the Missouri
Supreme Court, spawned six GVRs—two to the Fifth Circuit and four to as many
different state high courts. And Crawford v. Washington,255 decided in the previous
Term, led to six GVRs at the beginning of this Term, with three going to the Second
Circuit and the other three to state appellate courts. This situation—of GVRs to a
combination of federal and state courts—was less common than one in which all
of a single lead case’s multiple GVRs going to only to federal courts or only to
state courts. In addition, the ruling on reapportionment in Vieth v. Jubilirer,256
which had come to the Court from a three-judge court in the Middle District of
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Pennsylvania and had been decided in O.T. 2003, led the Court early in this Term
to GVR a set of five related cases from the Eastern District of Texas.
Beyond the already-noted forty Booker GVRs issued in O.T. 2005, there were
thirty-two others GVR’d in light of lead cases, three more in light of a statute of
regulation,257 and one on the basis of a state’s acknowledgment that a state
appellate court had denied rehearing.258 Half of the thirty-two in-light-of-case
GVRs were single instances, but three lead cases led to multiple GVRs. Exxon
Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries,259 decided late the previous Term, resulted
in four GVRs starting on the first day of the Term and continuing into November.
Burlington Northern v. Santa Fe Railroad v. White,260 handed down on June 22,
2006, almost at Term’s end, led only eight days later to five GVRs (to several
courts). And Davis v. Washington,261 which had come from the Supreme Court of
Indiana and was also decided quite late in the Term (June 19, 2006), led to seven
GVRs, on either June 20 or June 30, all but one of which were directed to state
appellate courts. (One redistricting case—an appeal from a three-judge district
court in the Eastern District of Texas—led to two GVRS to the same court of
related cases only two days later).262
b. The 2006 Term Forward
In O.T. 2006, once again saw a large number of GVRs—233—and as with
Booker, a high proportion (177) of them were accounted for by one case,
Cunningham v. California,263 another in the series of those dealing with whether a
judge or jury should make certain determinations. Counter to the Booker aftermath,
where almost all the GVRs were in cases from federal appellate courts, all the
Cunningham-based GVRs were of petitions from state appellate courts. All but
fourteen of those were from either the California Supreme Court or various
districts of the California Court of Appeal; the bulk came on February 20, 2007, a
month after Cunningham was handed down on January 22, 2007, with ten coming
a month later and the remainder scattered in April through June.
What about the other more than fifty non-Cunningham GVRs? There were the
frequent single GVRs after a lead case, three instances of two GVRs, and one case
that led to three. There were, however, some cases producing more, even if not of

257. Artega-Ruis v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 1059 (2005); Mohanned Lamine Didwara v. Gonzales, 546 U.S.
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the dimensions of those stemming from Cunningham. Relatively early in the Term
on December 5, 2006, the Court handed down Lopez v. Gonzales,264 on whether
immigrants were not disqualified from discretionary cancellation of removal,
which had come from the Eighth Circuit. Six days later came seventeen GVRs in
light of this ruling. The only other case in this Term producing more than a few
GVRs was Jones v. Bock,265 a Sixth Circuit case which led to eight GVRs, four of
which were also to the Sixth Circuit, but the others went to other courts of appeals.
Three GVRs based on Cunningham carried over to the 2007 Term’s first day.
That Term saw a total of 177 GVRs, a decrease from the previous Term. The great
majority of these GVRs were the result of only two cases: Gall v. United States266
and Kimbrough v. United States,267 both decided on December 10, 2007. The
GVRs in light of each (one was in light of both) took place quite soon, with thirtytwo Gall GVRs (of a total of seventy-four) and forty-two Kimbrough GVRs (of a
total of sixty-one) being issued a month after the lead case, on January 7, 2008.
Further Gall GVRs came a week later—six on January 14 and six more on January
22, with the remainder extending throughout the remainder of the Term, with a
“lump” of seven on May 12. The smaller numbers of Kimbrough GVRs tailed off
more rapidly, as after January 7 there were nine on January 14 and four on January
22, but only five more thereafter.
It is interesting that, although single GVRs based on the lead case had been
standard in previous Terms, in O.T. 2007 only half the cases leading to GVRs
produced only one such order. Six cases each led to 2–4 GVRs and one case to six
such dispositions, where Danforth v. Minnesota268 led to GVRs in five Idaho cases
along with one from Texas. The only other “clot” of GVRs from a single case
resulted from Begay v. United States,269 which led to thirteen GVRs, all to the
Tenth Circuit, where Begay had originated (two), Fourth Circuit (two), and the
Eighth Circuit (nine).
The number of GVRs in O.T. 2008 was noticeably less than in previous Terms,
only seventy-six, and thirty-one of these were the result of Chambers v. United
States,270 decided on January 13, 2009, with all but a few of the GVR’s stemming
from it came a week later, on January 26. Of the remainder, two each were late
GVRs from Gall and Begay, with Begay added to Chambers as an “in light of”
case in three instances. Only a slight majority were the one-GVR-from-lead-case
situations. Two cases led to five GVRs each—Jimenez v. Quarterman,271 with all
but one sent to the Fifth Circuit, from which Jimenez had come, and Melendez-
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Diaz v. Massachusetts,272 with the GVRs it produced also going to state courts in
Massachusetts (three) and one each to Ohio and California. The Gant search case273
produced a mix of GVRs to federal courts (four cases to three circuits) and three
separate state courts. One should not forget that in addition to GVRs issued “in
light of” a (usually) recent Supreme Court ruling, there are occasional GVRs in
light of something else, as apparent in two cases in this Term that were GVR’d in
light of a position in the Solicitor General’s brief.274
The number of GVRs continued to decline in O.T. 2009, with only fifty-five
issued in light of a case, with the smaller number was likely a result of the absence
of any single case that led to large numbers of GVRs. The largest number of GVRs
resulting from a single case was fifteen, stemming from Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder.275 Only one other case prompted more than four GVRs—the end-of-Term
Skilling v. United States,276 which led to vacating the convictions of Richard
Scrushy277 and former Governor Don Siegelman.278 Both were Eleventh Circuit
cases.
Among the GVRs in light of the previous Term’s Melendez-Diaz case, one
finds the different wording, “We vacate the judgment . . . and remand the case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. . .”279 There were also two
Seventh Circuit cases GVR’d in light of an en banc ruling from that court.280 One
should also note the several GVRs not in light of a case but in light of some other
element. In this Term, one finds a GVRs in light of the DHS Appropriations Act
of 2010 and a certification by the Secretary of Defense281 and six cases GVR’d
light of a position taken by either the Solicitor General or Acting Solicitor
General.282
The Court issued further reduced numbers of GVRs in O.T. 2010 and, most
importantly, no ruling led to as many as ten. Indeed, the largest number of GVRs
stemmed from the previous Term’s Carachuri-Rosendo decision,283 and the Court
handed them down on the first day of the present Term. As to cases decided in this
Term, none prompted more than five GVRs: the late-in-Term (June 23, 2011)
Freeman v. United States,284 leading to one GVR to the Sixth Circuit, from which
272. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
273. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
274. Dallangra v. United States, 555 U.S. 1092, 1092 (2009); Jackson v. United States, 555. U.S. 1183
(2009).
275. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
276. 561 U.S. 368 (2010).
277. Scrushy v. United States, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010).
278. Siegelman v. United States, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010).
279. Briscoe v. Virginia, 559 U.S. 32, 33 (2010).
280. Welton v. United States, 559 U.S. 1034 (2010); Ryals v. United States, 561 U.S. 1003 (2010); United
States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
281. Dep’t of Def. v ACLU, 558 U.S. 1042 (2009).
282. See Williamson v. United States, 561 U.S. 1003 (2010) (garnering four dissents to the GVR).
283. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
284. 564 U.S. 522 (2011).
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Freeman had come, and two GVRs each to the First and Third Circuits. One GVR
resulted when a cert petition came from a case which had been reversed in another
Supreme Court case,285 and another derived from the very case the Court had
decided—Brown v. Plata286—the prison overcrowding case from a three-judge
district court.
October Term 2011 also at first seemed to reflect the decreased number of
GVRs, with only fifty-four total (and one in light of the Solicitor-General’s
position) recorded in the Supreme Court Reporter for this Term, with no more than
six GVRs resulting from any single case. There were two such: Reynolds v. United
States,287 from the Third Circuit, which led to GVRs to the First, Second, and
Eighth Circuits, and Martinez v. Ray,288 a Ninth Circuit case that prompted GVRs
to that circuit (one), the Fifth and Sixth Circuits (two each), and one to a state
appellate court. Another case from the Ninth Circuit, Holder v. MartizezGutierrez,289 led to four GVRs, all to that same court of appeals.
As occasionally happened and was to take place in the carryover from O.T.
2011 to O.T. 2012, West Publishing included a very large number (fifty-nine) of
end-of-Term GVRs, from June 29, 2012, in the following Terms Supreme Court
Reporter (133 S. Ct.), which covered O.T. 2012. There were ten GVRs prompted
by Williams v. Illinois,290 three going to federal courts and seven to state courts,
but the bulk of them were accounted for by forty-three GVRs deriving from Dorsey
v. United States,291 decided only five days earlier. There were fifteen more Dorseybased GVRs on the first day of O.T. 2012, with further overlap between Terms as
a result of GVRs based on Miller v. Alabama,292 two of which took place on June
29 and three on October 1, 2012. If the “misplaced” GVRs are counted, as they
should be, in O.T. 2011, the number of GVRs becomes 113, an increase from the
prior Terms, but the number remaining for O.T. 2012 then reflects a further
decrease in GVRs per Term. Excluding the June 29, 2012, GVRs from the O.T.
2012 count, there were only forty-five (additional) GVRs in light of cases decided
in that Term. Of the cases that prompted GVRs, slight less than half (twenty-two
of forty-six) resulted in only one or two GVRs, but two produced more: Alleyne v.
United States293 resulted in twelve, all but one of which were to U.S. courts of

285. Amara v. Cigna Corp., 563 U.S. 1004 (2011) (reaching GVR in light of the week-earlier Cigna Corp.
v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011)).
286. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). The GVR’d case is Cal. State Republican Legis. Intervenors v. Plata, 563 U.S.
1018 (2011).
287. 565 U.S. 432 (2012).
288. 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
289. 566 U.S. 583 (2012). This was a consolidated case, the other case with it being Holder v. Sawyers.
290. 567 U.S. 50 (2012).
291. 567 U.S. 260 (2012).
292. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
293. 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
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appeals, and Trevino v. Thaler294 from the Fifth Circuit, all but two of which went
back to the court of appeals which had originated the lead case.
In October 2013, there were only forty-nine GVRs in light of a specific case,
with another five in light of the Solicitor-General’s position and two more because
of the government’s confession of error. One would expect at least some GVRs
early in the Term to be based on the previous Term’s cases, but not until December
9 was a GVR was based on a ruling made during the previous Term. For once, by
far the greatest number of cases resulting in GVRs led to only one each—nineteen
of the twenty-eight “in light of” cases—and only one case—Paroline v. United
States,295 regarding restitution for victims of child pornography, which produced
nine GVRs—led to more than four. One GVR to the Fourth Circuit was for
reconsideration in light of that court’s own ruling.296
The number of GVRs in O.T. 2014 was roughly double the previous Term’s
number. That overall picture is misleading, however, as two-thirds of the GVRs
are accounted for by two end-of-Term cases. With those excluded, the pattern for
the remaining thirty-two cases—eight of which came at Term’s end—was like that
for the previous Term; with most Supreme Court rulings (thirteen of twenty)
leading to only one GVR. Of those rulings, one was another Parolene-based GVR.
Another—Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz,297 a Federal Circuit case—lead
to five GVRs, all to that same court of appeals.
At the end of the Term, however, “all hell broke loose” for GVRs, although
this was only relatively speaking, as the number nowhere achieved the volume of
Booker GVRs. First, on June 1, 2015, came the bankruptcy case of Bank of
America NA v. Caulkett,298 which led to twenty-one GVRs. From a period of June
8 to June 15, all twenty-one were sent to the Eleventh Circuit, from which Caulkett
had come. All the petitions had been from non-precedential rulings, indicating that
Eleventh Circuit panels had applied the circuit precedent which was then reversed
by the Supreme Court. This was followed on June 26—at Term’s end—by Johnson
v. United States,299 on the so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA). This prompted forty-two GVRs, an indication that any case
implicating sentencing—like Apprendi, Booker, and Cunningham—is a producer
of many GVRs. The cases GVR’d in light of Johnson came from all circuits but
the District of Columbia and Tenth Circuits, with the largest number (eleven) from
the Eleventh Circuit.
O.T. 2015 saw a total of 119 GVR orders for the Term in light of a case, plus
one resulting from a confession of error. Roughly half (sixty-one) were accounted

294. 569 U.S. 413 (2013).
295. 572 U.S. 434 (2014).
296. Newbold v. United States, 571 U.S. 1119 (2014) (reaching GVR in light of Miller v. United States,
735 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2013)).
297. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
298. 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015).
299. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
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for by two cases: Johnson, from the previous Term (twenty GVRs), and
Montgomery v. Louisiana300 with forty-one GVRs. Federal courts of appeals (two)
and numerous state appellate courts issued the GVRs based on Montgomery, with
the largest numbers going to courts in Louisiana, from which the case had come
(nine) and Alabama (twenty-six).
As usual, the majority of cases that were the basis for GVRs (thirteen of
twenty-five) led to only a single GVR. However, while nineteen lead cases
produced no more than four GVRs, three cases led to eight or nine GVRs. The first
of those was Zubik v. Burwell,301 one of the decisions on challenges to required
contraceptive coverage in employees’ insurance, with cases returned to the
Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits (one case each), the Seventh (three), and
the Eighth Circuit (two). The other case stimulating eight GVRs was Birchfield v.
North Dakota,302 at Term’s end, but the Court returned all of those cases to the
Supreme Court of North Dakota, from which the lead case had emanated. Mathis
v. United States,303 an Eighth Circuit case on which the Court ruled on June 23,
produced nine GVRs—two of which went back to the Eighth Circuit while two
each also went to the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, and one to the Eleventh
Circuit.
October Term 2015 was quite interesting in the Court’s GVR practice for
another reason. Since the brouhaha over Lawrence, seldom had a Justice’s separate
statement accompanied a GVR order, although there had been a dissent by several
Justices (noted earlier) and Justice Alito had filed a concurrence to GVRs in light
of to the GVRs stemming from the previous Term’s Johnston v. United States.304
Now in the Montgomery GVRs, one finds an extended statement by Justice
Thomas—joined by Justice Alito—concurring in those GVRs. They noted that the
GVR’d cases had been held until Montgomery was decided and they provided
GVR-related guidelines rarely seen. Furthermore, they emphasized that “the Court
has not assessed whether petitioner’s asserted entitled to retroactive relief” was
presented properly below, and they reminded lower courts that a GVR order “does
not reflect any view regarding petitioner’s entitlement to relief.”305
However, the two Justices went further in their criticism of the Court’s practice
in a dissent by Justice Alito joined by Justice Thomas, from a GVR issued in light
of Foster v. Chatman.306 Justice Alito began by noting that GVRs were often used
“when we believe that the lower court should give further thought to the decision
in light of an opinion of this Court that (1) came after the decision under review
and (2) changed or clarified the governing legal principles in a way that could

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
Arroyo v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2925 (2015); see also 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
Tolliver v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016).
136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
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possibly alter the decision of the lower court.”307 Here however, while Foster—
the “in light of” case—had “postdated” the state court’s ruling, it “did not change
or clarify” the underlying rule of Batson v. Kentucky.308 As a result, the Court was
not ordering GVR in light of Foster but instead in light of Batson itself, a 30-yearold decision which was fully available to the state high court.309 Moreover, Alito
argued that the Court, not wanting to engage in careful review of “case-specific
factual questions” (about the prosecutor’s intent in striking prospective jurors), had
sent the case back “so that the lower court can do—or, redo—that hard work,”
something he believed was “not a responsible use of the GVR power,” adding “If
the majority is not willing to spend the time that full review would require, it should
deny the petition.”310
Justices Thomas and Alito were not the only Justices to add comments to
GVRs during this Term. The post-Zubik v. Burwell GVRs were accompanied by
identical statements by Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, concurring for reasons
they had stated in Zubik itself as to the government’s ability to ensure access to
contraceptives by relying on the challenging litigants’ statements as notice.311
O.T. 2016 puts the numbers of GVRs back below a total of fifty, six of which
were additions to the previous Term’s Montgomery v. Louisiana GVRs, with
Justice Alito and Thomas continuing to dissent from this set of orders, and eleven
were also from the previous Term’s Mathis case, with the later cases being returned
to several courts of appeals. (There was also a GVR in light of respondent’s brief
and another sent back to dismiss for mootness). Some 29% of the GVRs other than
in light of Montgomery were of the one-GVR-per-lead-case type. Of the several
lead cases that led to 2–4 GVRs, in one situation, three of four GVRs in light of
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Currier,312 from the Eighth Circuit, were
to the same Supreme Court of Colorado case.
There was a statement from Justice Sotomayor concurring in the Montgomery
GVRs.313 Justice Alito made a brief reference to his Montgomery GVR dissent, but
then took a tack specific to this case. Here he “expect[ed] that the Arizona courts
will be as puzzled by this [GVR] directive as I am.”314 The Montgomery ruling had
held Miller v. Alabama315 retroactive, he noted, and “[t]he Arizona cases at issue
here were decided after Miller, and in each case the court expressly assumed that
Miller was applicable to the sentence that had been imposed.” Accordingly, that
left “nothing for those courts to do.”316 Continuing his earlier argument that the
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
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See Burwell v. Dordt College, 136 S. Ct. 2006 (2016).
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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Court was misusing its GVR authority, he said, “We do not GVR so that a lower
court can reconsider the application of a precedent that it has already
considered.”317 In the present instance, as the state courts had already examined
the relevant precedent, with “eminently reasonable” conclusions, “It is not clear
why this Court is insisting on a do-over, or why it expects the results to be any
different the second time around.”318
In October Term 2017, which saw the retirement of Justice Kennedy at Term’s
end, there were seventeen cases resulting in a total of sixty-two GVRs. Half of the
“lead” cases each led to only one or two GVRs; one of those was the travel ban
case, Trump v. Hawaii,319 which was handed down on June26, 2018 at Term’s end,
and was followed two days later by two GVRs—both deriving from the same
Fourth Circuit case.320 However, Sessions v. Dimaya321 was a “large generator,”
leading to twenty-seven GVRs by mid-March and another five at Term’s end.322
Several other cases prompted more than a couple of GVRs. Hughes v. United
States323 and National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra324 each
resulted in four GVRs, but those stemming from Hughes were to differing circuits,
while all those from Dimaya were directed to the Ninth Circuit, the source of the
lead case. Five GVRs—to both federal and state courts—resulted from Carpenter
v. United States,325 concerning use of signal tower locator data, but as Carpenter
was decided on June 22 and the GVRs came six days later, more such orders would
be likely at the beginning of O.T. 2018. As well, seven GVRs from petitions from
the Fifth Circuit, resulted from Rosales-Mireles v. United States.326
For O.T. 2018, the GVR picture is not particularly striking, with just under
fifty such orders, all but eight of which were in light of lead cases; the others were
four to consider mootness—a higher-than-usual number, two in light of the
Solicitor General’s position and two in light of the First Step Act of 2018. Of those
in light of a case, a dozen were in light of rulings from the previous Term, with
four stemming from Sessions v. Dimaya327 and each of the remaining eight single
GVRs deriving from different cases, with one coming from Janus on union dues328

317. Id.
318. Id. at 14.
319. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
320. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistant
Project, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018).
321. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
322. This is an undercount as one GVR to the Fifth Circuit applied to multiple non-precedential rulings
that had appeared in Federal Appendix.
323. 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).
324. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
325. 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018).
326. 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018).
327. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
328. Fleck v. Wetch, 139 S.Ct. 590 (2018) (reaching GVR in light of Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty.
& Mun. Emp., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)).
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and one in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop.329 The remaining twenty-eight GVRs
were in light of cases decided within the Term. In just under half of those, a lead
case generated only one GVR and in five, the GVR order was filed immediately
after the Court’s decision or very shortly thereafter. Only three lead cases resulted
in multiple GVRs. One, Stokeling v. United States330 from the Eleventh Circuit and
decided early in the Term, led to a half-dozen GVRs, all to the Seventh Circuit.
The other two rulings only started generating GVRs in this Term, with many more
coming in O.T. 2019: Rehaif v. United States,331 which resulted in four GVRS, and
United States v. Davis,332 which prompted a half-dozen, a relatively small
proportion of the number of GVRs each was ultimately to generate. As both cases
dealt with aspects of sentencing (scienter as to guns; violent felony residual
clause), they fit within the dominant pattern in which sentencing-related lead cases
produced great numbers of GVRs.
In O.T. 2019, the incidence of GVRs continued the previous pattern. A small
number of cases were GVR’d in light of statutory provisions, such as three in light
of the National Defense Authorization Act and others in light of the First Step Act
of 2018 and the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of
2019. Several Supreme Court decisions each prompted either a single GVR or two,
and there were three in light of Rucho v. Common Cause—the partisan
gerrymander ruling from the end of the previous Term—two from the Southern
District of Ohio and one from the Eastern District of Michigan. Of particular note,
however, are the multiple GVRs prompted by the Rehaif and Davis sentencingrelated cases, which had begun to produce GVRs shortly after they were decided
at the end of the previous Term. The numbers of GVRs these cases generated do
not reach those resulting from Booker, but they are substantial—thirty by March
2010 for GVRs based on Rehaif and almost a dozen for Davis-based GVRs, with
a few coming later. Also of note is that almost a dozen cases were returned to
various districts of the Court of Appeals of Louisiana (and one to the Court of
Appeals of Oregon) in light of the unanimous-verdict decision, Ramos v.
Louisiana333 a week after that decision.
As O.T. 2019 extended into July 2020, the Court issued seventeen GVRs based
on nine different cases, all but one of which had been decided toward Term’s end.
Of note were four in light of the McGirt case on Indian territory in Oklahoma334
and three in light of the Little Sisters of the Poor case on the religious exemption
from contraceptive coverage under employees’ insurance.335 Just as had taken

329. Klein v. Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (reaching GVR in light of Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
330. 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019).
331. 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
332. 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
333. 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
334. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
335. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
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place at the end of O.T. 2011, orders from Term’s end were not reported in the
Supreme Court Reporter until its first advance sheet issue in O.T. 2020.
III. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Supreme Court’s patterns of practice with respect to consolidation,
grouping, and linkage of opinions, and its use of GVR orders, have been examined
in this Article. The pattern with respect to each has exhibited change over time,
from the late 1950s to the period of Warren Court–Burger Court transition of the
late 1960s–early 1970s, and then to the decades beginning the in mid-1980s. Over
time, the Court has engaged in less consolidation of cases, less grouping, and
likewise, less linking of cases. Over the same period, there has been a considerable
growth—over and above the increase in the number of cert petitions—in the
Court’s use of GVR dispositions, especially those sent back to the lower court for
consideration “in light of” a particular Supreme Court decision. As noted earlier,
the growth in cert petitions may itself result in part from the increase in GVRs as
litigants file cert petitions—one that, at an earlier time might not have been filed—
in hopes of obtaining a GVR. Patterns of GVR practice have also become relatively
stable, with most GVRs in light of a leading case following soon after the lead case
has been filed, and there are relatively few GVRs for any individual “lead” case,
the principal exception relating to sentencing, such as Booker, the outlier in GVRs
generated.
That the two patterns—decreased consolidation, increased GVRs—are related
seems clear. Certainly, it is important that changes in each of the two practices be
understood in their own rights, but the possible interrelationship should not be
ignored. It is not only that, over the same period they happened simultaneously, or
in parallel. Something more seems to be at work. In particular, both patterns are
related to the decrease in the number of cases the Court has decided after plenary
treatment: there are few cases to be consolidated and grouped, the continued
increase in the number of cert petitions brings more cases that could be GVR’d.
Is this situation one of coincidence, of correlation, or of causation? Certainly,
the decrease in the Court’s output was not coincidental. Through their individual
votes, the Justices decided to grant review to fewer cases, even if they never issued
a statement saying, “We are decreasing the size of our docket.” That decrease was
not a result of “things that go bump in the night.” It can be fairly said that the Court
did engage in purposeful action, even if doing so without explicit announcement
of a change in policy or the promulgation of a rule.
Certainly, a change in the Court’s rules is a matter of formal announcement,
but changes in practice may not be embodied in a rule. See, for example, the
Court’s shift in the 1960s from convening for oral argument at noon to convening
at 10:00AM, or the shift at roughly the same time from exclusive use of Mondays
as Decision Day to use as well of other days on which opinions were to be released.
Instead, observers’ watchful examination over time may be required for changes
in practice to be clear. Although of course, when the Justices do occasionally speak
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out—for example, as Justice Scalia did in Lawrence and Stutson—practices and
their changes may be exposed, but that type of situation is the exception.
The decrease in the consolidation of cases and their grouping or linking—
which has gone beyond what might be expected with a smaller docket—required
that some direction be provided by the Justices, likely after discussion in
conference, as the Clerk of Court could not have done it on his own, and the linking
of cases, as when a dissent applied to multiple cases, did not happen except through
the Justices’ own actions. Likewise, with the increased use of GVRs: whatever the
reasons that lead an individual Justice to support a specific GVR order, the Justices
are obviously not unaware of each other’s votes and their collective action was
purposeful.
Yet did the Justices intentionally tie the two together? They must have been
aware of the actions constituting each pattern, but they have not told us whether
they were aware of the relationship. Individuals intensely involved in a certain
activity, such as getting cases out by Term’s end, may pay less attention to the
overall picture created by their actions with respect to individual cases. It remains
for the reader to decide whether the patterns portrayed here and their relationship
is sufficiently persuasive to say they are causally related. If not persuaded of that,
at least it is hoped that changes in these practices have now been made more clear.
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